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The Restoration and Development of Economic Relations in 1920s.

Massive technological transfer as the Government’s policy began after the October Revolution of 1917, when national development, political tasks, traditional thinking were drastically changed.

The young Soviet Republic worked hard to re-establish diplomatic and commercial relations with the U.S. Government and American companies soon after the Revolution. Head of the Soviet state Vladimir I. Lenin considered economic relations with America as the matter of prime importance. "We need American manufacturing production, like locomotives, automobiles etc., even more, than from any other country", stressed Lenin in his interview to the World newspaper correspondent in February 192011. The same he expressed on other occasions. Early Soviet "trade diplomacy" was conducted in absence of diplomatic recognition and without the official permission by the United States. Political refugee and former Russian revolutionary of German origin, Ludwig K.

Martens, lived in New York and maintained links with the Bolsheviks. In the beginning of 1919 he was authorized by the Soviet Government to be the trade representative of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federate Republic.

Despite propagandist success of his mission and readiness of many American companies to establish commercial relations with the Soviet Government, the first trade agent was prosecuted and finally deported from the United States in the beginning of 1921. Before departure to Russia Martens received instructions from Moscow to cancel all agreements made by him in America

The U.S. official standpoint was that the Soviet leadership had no proper idea about honest business transactions, conducted irresponsible and subversive policy, refused to return debts of previous Governments and compensate for expropriated property of American citizens and companies. In response, the Soviet Government claimed that the U.S.

military intervention during the Civil War inflicted serious damages to Russia, but restoration of trade and granting concessions would give a new ground and impetus for American business in this country[97]. Concessions were granted in manufacturing, lumber industry, trade, transportation, mining, fishing, hunting, etc., and were of two types.

The first type, or pure concession, was a contractual right of foreign company to use, develop and exploit some Soviet property (a tract of land, public utilities, factory, mine, oil field, etc.) for certain period of time, in order to get surplus or profit, taxed by the Soviet state. The company was obliged to reconstruct or build production units, increase productivity, maintain social infrastructure (schools, roads, housing), to fulfill labor contracts, and conform to the Soviet rules and legislation. Upon expiration of agreed terms, foreign partner was to return the enterprise or other property in use. The state often retained the right to buy out the conceded enterprise before the term expired.

The second type, or mixed concession, meant an enterprise in which Soviet and foreign capital shares were equal or almost equal (51 to 49) with a Soviet chairman of the board. Foreign firm brought capital, technology, skilled labor, while the Soviets provided the ’’opportunity", location, raw materials and the bulk of labor force. Profits were to be divided in two.

So-called “technical concession" was, in fact, a technical assistance agreement, without foreign capital investment. By the end of the 1920s that type had been identified as "technical assistance" everywhere in the Soviet Union. In fact, only pure or mixed enterprises with foreign capital were real concessions.

According to Soviet data, in 1928, upon expiration of the New Economic Policy (NEP), there existed 114 concessions (61 national and 53 local), including a number of “technical” agreements with American, German, British and other companies and citizens[98].

According to A.C. Sutton, the number of operating concessions in 1920-1930 comprised 128 pure and 93 mixed ones. Of them, the American companies had, respectively, 35 and 14. There were also 118 “technical" agreements[99]. Some Russian historians disagree with Sutton on the character of certain foreign ventures, for an instance, in Baku oil industry: if foreign company trained Russian workers to use her equipment, such business was close to technical assistance[100].

“Pure" concessions were profitable to the Soviets at the very beginning of 20s, because of state capital shortage. To accomplish large projects, companies from several countries were invited. In such cases it is not easy to define whose contribution was greater, because they fulfilled important and interconnected tasks. Speedy restoration and development of the fuel and power industries were so urgent, that concessions were added or quickly replaced by sending Russian engineers abroad to learn techniques, and by purchases of machinery.

The agreement, concluded in 1922 with the International Barnsdall Corporation for 15,5 years to reconstruct the Baku oil fields, was cancelled under the pressure of its Soviet partner, the state trust “Azneft”, in Baku, Azerbaijan, in August 30, 1924. Long-term missions aimed at learning oil business in the United States, purchases of tools and machinery to produce modern equipment for oil-well drilling in Baku and other Soviet plants, came instead.

Besides technical skills, the very organization and management of American oil business was praised by the Azneft chief, Alexander P. Serebrovsky, who was called the “Soviet Rockefeller”[101]. In 1924 he met John D. Rockefeller- Sr., won his confidence and sympathy, established business relations with the Standard Oil of New York, and explored oil and gaz fields in the United States. He not only recommended, but introduced “American methods" at the Baku oil region[102]. Soon the Soviet oil men were sent to the USA to study the newest techniques of oil refining and pipeline construction.

In 1926, concession was granted to the Standard Oil of New York to build and exploit the Batum kerosene plant. "Mixed" concessions were used in pipelines building, in combination with technical assistance, training Soviet personnel, and importation of equipment. American and European companies participated in modernization of coal mines in Donbass and Kuzbass. By the end of 1925 technical assistance agreements with American companies Stuart, James amp; Cooke, Roberts amp; Schaefer, Allen amp; Garcia ousted concessions from the coal mining industry.

The most contradictory issue in the history of the Soviet concession policy is the real economic and legal status of the enterprises with foreign capital. Here the Russian and Western viewpoints are diametrically opposite. Soviet historians asserted, that after careful selection of proposals from abroad the Government strictly observed its commitments and provided concessionaires with all necessary conditions. If business failed, it was the concessionaire's problem, caused by “inability” or "adventurer’s behavior"[103]. American historians pointed out the defenselessness of concessions, their shaky position during the NEP. That the Soviets combined permissions and strict limitations on private ventures, is unquestionable. At this juncture, the American viewpoint deserves attention.

The Soviet state granted concessions for 15, 20,30 years or more to attract Western capital by profits on long-term investments, but tried to get rid of foreigners as soon as they provided necessary investments, skills and technologies. Compensations were paid but partly, if any. The Soviets practiced various pressures to make business impossible: used excessive taxation, forbade to export currency, inspired strikes, frequent labor unions inspections and the OGPU (political police) raids. For example, an opposition of German and Russian specialists to the Soviet power caused liquidation of the Junkers concession[104]. Finding conditions precarious and Soviet demands oppressive, foreign companies preferred to withdraw without refund, and the Soviets took over the working enterprise[105].

The W. Averell Harriman manganese ore concession in Chiaturi, Georgian Soviet Republic, was the largest and, perhaps, the least successful American venture in the Soviet Union. The contract was signed in 1925 for 20 years, but remained in force about three years. The company was to agree with its cancellation because of unfavorable combination of foreign competition, price decline, high costs and non-stop interference by local authorities and trade-union. In one year 127 working days were lost because of various control inspections. The ultimate conflict rose around currency exchange: Harriman engineers preferred to change dollars for rubles at private traders, because of very low rate at the Soviet state bank. In the meantime, American managers tried to rise wages and improve working conditions. Mira Wilkins quoted report of one company’s engineer:

"The manganese [ore] was being handled by oxcart over frightful roads. The employees were barefooted and in rags, they slept on the ground in stables with the oxen. This was soon changed. The Americans raised wages to the highest level in Russia. Permission was obtained to import clothing. Men in the mines were equipped with boots and rubber hats and slickers. All laborers were given British army shoes. Then the trouble began. The individual workmen were mostly well satisfied but the "professional" proletarians were only getting started. Their demands rose constantly with the sky as the limit. And it is interesting to note that the first action of the Soviets after the Americans left [in 1928] was to cut wages 20% and collect all the imported shoes and clothing. The latter were sold in Tiflis and lined the pockets of several worthy communists"[106].

The Soviets won not only boots and clothing. Harriman invested about $3,450,000 in technical reconstruction of manganese works, but could not get his money back. Instead, he was induced by the Chief Concession Committee to convert this investment in 15-years loan, and give $1,000,000 as additional loan.

The Amtorg[107] concession committee noted in 1929, that Harriman "avoids to harm us publicly, but tells so much negative about the Soviet Union to every visitor, who wants an information, that hardly anyone would wish to negotiate about concession after conversation with him, or, especially, with his directors"[108].

The Ford Motor Company conducted cautious policy. Before taking final decision to build a tractor or car factory on concession terms, five its managers visited the Soviet Union in April-August 1926 to survey economic, social and labor conditions. Personal observations and talks at the Chief Concession Committee convinced Ford men, that "the question of the Company laying down any kind of a manufacturing plant on Soviet soil would be nothing short of madness". The most unfavorable features of that project were, according to their report, as follows:

1). Placing of one labor representative to every 300 (or even one to every 60) workmen employed, whose whole work would be devoted to looking out after welfare of employees. 2). Price fixing by Government of finished products. . Export of tractors allowed only after home demand satisfied. 4). Export foreign exchange once a year and only after Government's audit of Company’s books. 5). Difficulties and high costs of getting raw materials. Besides, the Ford managers hesitated about safety of concession. "We could not with confidence feel that the [Soviet] Government would not take the plant over itself (without compensation and before stipulated time limit expired)... There are various ways in which the Government could do this, and in the absence of diplomatic recognition [of the USSR], no help could be expected from the American Government...[109] While the [Soviet] Government has not succeeded in attracting foreign capital for manufacturing purposes, it had succeeded, to some extent, in interesting large companies in mining or other projects, the principal business of which is taking materials out of the country. Yet no concessionaire can be named that is not experiencing great difficulty in operating his concession"[110]. As a result, the company refused to build the tractor plant in the Soviet Union.

Western businessmen and politicians remembered statements by V.l. Lenin and other Soviet leaders about temporary character of concessions, labeled as “continuation of war against capital", and the like. Joseph Stalin considered socialism as a system without private capital, foreign or domestic, and reported his vision to the Leningrad Bolshevik Party organization in April, 1926. He mentioned foreign trade and said nothing about concessions. It was unequivocal hint, that the foreign investments' time was numbered.

In July, 1926 L.D. Trotsky, the Chief Concession Committee head, stressed the importance of quick return on giving concessions: in 3 - 5 years, not at distant future, and insisted upon limitation of foreign investments to the Soviet economy to 10%[111]. In the same time Trotzky stressed the importance of economic ties with the West and warned against a "socialist version of the Monroe doctrine": isolationist tendencies would retard the nation's development. To attract American investors, the Amtorg Concession Committee in April, 1927 confirmed guarantees against confiscation, requisitions, breaking or altering contract by unilateral act, and offered long terms to repay investments[112].

Be it truth, most concessions operated safely till 1940s. In the fall of 1927, however, the XV Bolshevik Party Congress declared necessity of wide technical assistance instead of concessions. Export trade was to serve the hard currency accumulation.

However, the Soviet Government tried to attract foreign investments (for example, in the automotive industry) up to the beginning of 1929, when the first Five-year plan was in action. In December, 1929 the new Chief Concession Committee chairman, L.B. Kamenev, notified the Government that the concession planning was no more expedient[113]. A few ventures remained in force after 1930, like kerosene plant of Standard Oil in Batum or Japan oil field concession at the Sakhalin Island. Some of concessions proved to be useful, some remained futile, but all were short-lived. Their expulsion from the Soviet economic strategy was attributed to fundamental change of the Soviet economic policy at the end of 1920s. Liquidation of NEP put the end to private initiatives.

Enforced cessation of long-term ventures meant taking over their capital by the Soviets. Concessions contributed mostly to raw materials and extractive industries, of which oil fields, coal and gold mining were the most important. It was a logic preparation of quick development of manufacturing industries. American companies contributed outstandingly to the field of technical assistance.

Technical Assistance

In industrial sphere, the main tasks of the first Soviet Five-year plan were to construct basic capital-intensive enterprises, like aircraft, automobile, tractor, chemical, electrical, machine-building plants, power stations, transportation network, and move them eastward, in safer territories. By 1933 about 1,500 key enterprises had to be built anew or reconstructed. All this would be hardly attainable without large-scale transfer of Western technical achievements.

Technical assistance was either bought outright or included in a large equipment order. The contracts were much shorter, than concession terms, and looked attractive to both sides: foreign companies were not obliged to make risky investments, and the Soviet technicians and workers got the best opportunity to take over Western technologies and skills in the shortest time possible. Technical assistance needed hard currency to pay for, but the Soviet state monopoly in foreign trade permitted to export everything what was in great demand abroad - grain, food products, timber, oil, furs, non-ferrous metals, antiques and works of art. The USSR tried to establish favorable trade balance with every nation, and enjoy long-term credits. In 1929-1933 the Soviet Union had favorable (to various grade) trade balance with France, Italy, the United Kingdom, while trade with the most important technical assistance suppliers - the United States and, since 1930, with Germany, remained unfavorable[114].

Technical assistance agreements were by no means limited to delivery of blueprints, patents or machinery. Neither was it mere consultation or examination of the Soviet design. It had both technical and educational aspects. The contracted firm either amended or finished the Soviet project, or prepared, according to the given tasks, a detailed construction or technological design of the enterprise. The company was obliged to give full specifications of materials, equipment, tools and machinery, grant all necessary know-how, patents, licenses, etc.; to send the best experts to the Soviet Union to render supervision

at the construction site and help to start the enterprise; to permit a certain number of Soviet engineers and workers to study her production methods.

Soviet contracting organization had to compensate all expenses, including costs of design, fees and per diem allowances to employees, traveled to the USSR, provide them with suitable lodgings, interpreters, stationery etc. The firm received cash rewards (profit) - a stipulated per cent of general estimates of works, or a fixed sum. The Soviet organization supplied workforce, materials, and financed construction works. All negotiations with, and payments to the American firms went through Amtorg.

Foreign firms worked in close contact with Soviet specialists, who formulated demands and tasks, made corrections, evaluated and approved designs, selected equipment, tools and machinery according to given specifications. Purchase orders were placed at those companies, which gave better credit terms or sold cheaper; the designing firm was not necessarily a supplier. That was why a large Soviet enterprise received drawings and equipment from a number of American and European companies. Other sources of learning and taking up Western technological achievements were as follows:

Education. American and European cars, machinery and products were displayed at the Soviet industrial fairs, and films about factory production shown. On January 20, 1924, one day before his death, V.l. Lenin watched, with downright interest, a Ford film about tractor assembling[115]. Wide circulation of books by Henry Ford, Henry L. Gantt, Frederick W. Taylor, etc., translated into Russian and used for training in "scientific organization of work". The Soviet leaders admired Fordism, as a symbol for assembly line, rationalization and efficiency. Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the first chief of the Soviet political police and the Chairman of the Supreme Council for the National Economy (VSNH) in 1924- 1926 (until his death), stressed urgent necessity to learn and implement Ford methods[116].

Volunteer workforce, or guest workers. A good part of them was former Russians who left their mother country before the Revolution, as well as contracted American adherents to socialism, who wanted to help "Russian comrades". They found employment as skilled workers, foremen and coaches.

Copying of foreign equipment and machinery. To buy exemplary things to make copies was accepted Soviet practice. For example, attempts to build "Red Putilovetz", the poor copy of Fordson tractor, at the Red Putilov Works in Leningrad, after making drawings of disassembled parts. It resulted in enormous difficulties in the shop and disability of the Soviet tractors in the fields. The tractor builders did not know the secrets of mass production and of making special sorts of steel, patented by the Ford Motor Company. Charles Sorensen, Ford production chief, noted after his visit to the Soviet Union in August 1929: "In spite of the fact that they had stolen everything they could of the tractor, I offered to help them clear up the whole matter by sending them one of our experts from Dearborn"[117].

Fishing for economic and technical information was closely connected with various missions abroad. It was done via Amtorg, numerous engineering offices and examiners of purchased equipment, who represented various Soviet "trusts" (Autostroy, Magnitostroy, Traktorostroy, etc.).

Business trips and training abroad were considered in the Soviet Union as the most effective means to learn as much as possible, even if production secrets were concealed by the host companies. Hundreds of engineers, technicians, workers went abroad every year. Besides planned missions, Soviet customers used technical assistance agreements and equipment purchases contracts to send numerous students abroad. The Soviet mechanical engineer, Ilya Sheinman, described, with great astonishment, the openness and generosity of American managers and engineers. Sheinman and his Soviet mates enjoyed almost unbound access to various technical data and permission to make drawings, copies, blueprints free. Patents had to be bought, said him one manager, but all the rest was just "the best advertisement for the company"[118].

European practice seemed applicable to many Soviet industries. Documentary sources show that the technical assistance agreements with German companies were the most numerous till 1933. However, to produce cheaper and in larger volume, the Soviets needed industrial giants of American size. U.S. technical assistance was desirable in hydro-power plants erection, mining, chemistry, metallurgy, electrical engineering, but mostly in automotive, tractor, aircraft motors and other standardized mass production[119]. Its significance was appreciated despite unfavorable trade balance - in 1929 Soviet exports to the United States constituted only 24% against American imports.

In September 1927 “the standing committee for technical and scientific contacts with America" was created in the top Communist Party authority, Politburo[120]. A.C. Sutton enumerated 118 technical assistance agreements operated

in 1920-1930 (mostly in 1928-1930), and 218 in 1929-1945, of which 64 and 139, or 54% and 64% respectively, were concluded with U.S. companies[121].

The largest enterprises in Europe, like the Dnieper hydro-power station, the Stalingrad, Kharkov, Chelyabinsk tractor plants, the Magnitogorsk iron and steel works, the Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky) automobile factory utilized, to various extent, the newest American practice. The huge Dnieper Dam was designed in the USSR, with the expertise done by the Cooper Engineering Company and the German Siemens A.G. The Soviet chief designer, I.G. Aleksandrov, got acquainted with American achievements in river dam erection. Some important proposals, made by Cooper, were adopted, like the "arch" form of the Dnieper Dam, that enlarged the flow of water.

American methods caused a revolution in industrial design and construction. Speed and standardization marked the new era of industrial building[122]. Plans could be drawn and accepted while the excavation was being made. Different stages of planning were made simultaneously, not one after another; blueprinting used instead of slow tracing; standard steel and concrete constructions were chosen from catalogues and delivered at the construction site by telephone order. Unprecedented speed was made possible by the fabrication of steel for standard designs on a production basis long in advance of contracts. Such steel, ready for immediate use, was stocked in various parts of the United States to be called for. The largest building companies hired all specialists and workers, and made building and mounting operations mechanized.

In 1927 the Austin Company of Cleveland (architects, engineers, builders), an American pioneer of new construction methods, designed and build the 35- acre Pontiac No 6 car factory, then the world’s largest, for 7 months. It attracted attention of the Soviet organizations responsible for creation of national automobile industry, and August 23, 1929, Austin was contracted to design and supervise the erection of the auto plant in Nizhny Novgorod[123]. In accordance with Ford-VSNH agreement of May 31,1929, the Ford Motor Company made technological layouts and gave specifications, patents and licenses to make Ford cars A and trucks AA[124].

Famous American industrial architect Albert Kahn, whose firm designed a number of large American manufacturing plants, including Ford’s River Rouge complex, introduced to the Soviet Union his principle "all factory buildings for any one type of construction can be built on standardized principles. The result will be a great saving in time and in cost in the preparation of the plans and the cost of building”. Traditional "German” type of multistory factory was replaced by squat and long "boxes" for assembly lines. The Albert Kahn, Inc. created the Soviet school of industrial architecture and played key role in organization of Promstroyproekt (the Soviet Industrial Design Bureau) and also directed the Building Commission of VSNH[125].

Decision to build a tractor factory in Stalingrad was taken as early as in September 1925, but discussions and fourfold augmentation of planned original capacity continued up to the beginning of 1929. Construction and equipment demanded foreign expertise. In the long run, the Government entrusted the Albert Kahn, Inc., to make design in Detroit[126]. The model for the Stalingrad tractor became the International, built by the International Harvester Company of Chicago. Steel construction frames came from the United States. About 80 American and several German engineering firms participated in equipping the plant. More powerful plant in the city of Chelyabinsk, the Urals region, was designed, also by Kahn, to make Soviet Caterpillars, renamed into Stalinetz-60.

The first Soviet version of the Magnitogorsk iron and steel factory was abandoned, and its making was sold to the Arthur McKee Company of Cleveland, Ohio, USA, in March, 1930. The Soviet metallurgical factory prototype became the U.S. Steel Corporation plant at Gary, Indiana[127].

According to Soviet data, 170 technical assistance agreements were concluded by heavy industry staff in 1923-1933: 73 with German companies, 59 with American, 11 with French, 9 with Swedish and 18 with others[128]. It is hardly possible to calculate, which contribution, German or American, was principal, for many contracts were mixed. The Soviet state corporation Vostokostal made agreement with the Arthur McKee for designing the whole Magnitogorsk plant, where the German company Demag made the rolling shop design, and another German firm was responsible for boring works. All-Union Chemical Association Vsekhimprom made 20 agreements with various companies in the USA, Germany, Italy, France, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland[129].

The Nizhny Novgorod auto-plant was to receive about 2350 units of equipment from USA, 2300 from Europe, 550 from Soviet enterprises[130]. The International General Electric's equipment run most Soviet factories. Such a small but indispensable thing, as ball- and roller bearings, were made in the USSR at several big factories. The Moscow ball- and roller bearings plant, GPZ-1, used technical assistance by the Italian RIV Company (subsidiary of Fiat), was managed, in part, by Swedish SKF engineers, and was designed by the Albert Kahn, Inc. A.C. Sutton roughly estimated, that factory designs and layouts proved to be mostly American, and about one half of equipment installed came from Germany (a large amount of it was manufactured there to American design). In quantity, American equipment was probably the second, and British was the third[131].

Of those 170 agreements with American and European companies, 37 were canceled, for various reasons, before the expiration data. Some had been found by the Soviets too expensive, insufficient, or incompatible with Five-year plan schedule. In a number of cases the Soviet industrial base was not enough to cultivate advanced technologies, or they had been quickly mastered. The Arthur McKee broke relations with Russians. Financial disputes debarred the Arthur J. Brandt Company of Detroit from finishing technical reconstruction of AMO auto plant in Moscow, although Brandt’s design was found useful[132].

All payments to foreign companies were under constant watch of influential "Hard Currency Commission” (Valutnaya Kommissiya) of Politburo, which controlled foreign exchange accumulation and spending, thereby acting like a "ways and means committee". However, the industrialization burdens were also shared by the Western companies hired to render technical assistance. To comply with Soviet demands and accomplish projects tasks or orders, they bore additional costs. Their managers and other men, sent to the Soviet Union, had to overcome unforeseen and inadequate hardships of life and work. 

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Источник: Под ред. Е.В. Лобановой и М.В. Бибикова. Проблемы экономической истории: mundus oeconomicus.. 2006

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