<<
>>

ЛИТЕРАТУРА

Acheson J. М. 1985. The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 385-98.

Aghion P. and P. Bolton. 1992. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting.

Review of Economic Studies 59: 473-94.

Aghion P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey. 1990. On Renegotiation Design. European Economic Review 34: 322-29.

Aghion P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey. 1991. Renegotiation Design with Unveri- fiable Information. Mimeo.

Aivazian V. A., J. L. Callen and I. Lipnowski. 1987. The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability. Economica 54: 517-20.

Akerlof G. A. 1970. The Market for «Lemons»: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500.357 Akerlof G. A. 1982. Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 97: 543-69. Reprinted in: Akerlof and Yellen 1986. Akerlof G. A. and H. Miyazaki. 1980. The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment Meets the Wage Bill Argument. Review of Economic Studies 47: 321-38.

Akerlof G. A. and J. L. Yellen. 1986. Introduction. In: G. A. Akerlof and J. L. Yeb len, eds., Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. 1-21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albert H. 1967. Marktsoziologie und Entscheidungslogik—?konomische Probleme in soziologischer Perspektive. Soziologische Texte, Vol. 36. Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand.

Alchian A. A. 1950. Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy 58: 211-21.

Alchian A. A. 1958. Private Property and the Relative Cost of Tenure. In: P. D. Bradley, ed., The Public Stake in Union Power. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Reprinted in Alchian 1977a.

Alchian A. A. 1961. Some Economics of Property. RAND D-2316. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.

Alchian A. A. 1965a. The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Management of the Firm.

Journal of Industrial Economics 14: 30-41.

Alchian A. A. 1965b. Some Economics of Property Rights. Politico 30: 816-29. Reprinted in Alchian 1977a.

Alchian A. A. 1967. Pricing and Society. Occasional Papers, no. 17. Westminster: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Alchian A. A. 1969. Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment. Western Economic Journal 7: 109-28,

Alchian A. A. 1977a. Economic Forces at Work. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.

Alchian A. A. 1977b. Why Money? Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 9: 133-40.

Alchian A. A. 1984. Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions. Zeitschrift fUr die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 140: 34-49.

Alchian A. A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. American Economic Review 72: 777-95.358

Alchian A. A. and R. A. Kessel. 1962. Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain. In: National Bureau of Economic Research, Aspects of Labor Economics, 157-75. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Alchian A. A. and S. Woodward. 1987. Reflections on the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 110-37.

Alchian A. A. and S. Woodward. 1988. The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Economic Literature 26: 65-79.

Allen F. 1985. Repeated Principal-Agent Relationships with Lending and Borrowing. Economics Letters 17: 27-31.

Alston L. J., G. D. Libecap and R. Schneider. 1996. The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12: 25-61.

Alston L. J., G. J. Libecap and B. Mueller. 1997. Violence and the Development o*f Property Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon. In: J. N. Drobak and J. V. C. Nye, The Frontiers of New Institutional Economics, 145-63. San Diego: Academic Press.

Alt J. R., R. Calvert and B. Humes. 1988. Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis.

American Political Science Review 82: 445-66.

Alt J. R. and L. L. Martin. 1994. Contracting and the Possibility of Multilateral Enforcement. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 265- 71.

Amsden A. H. 1987. Imperialism. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 728-33. London: Macmillan.

Anderson T. L. and P. J. Hill. 1975. The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West. Journal of Law and Economics 18: 163-79.

Anderson T. L. and P Hill. 1983. Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement? Southern Economic Journal 54: 438-50.

Aoki M. 1983. Managerialism Revisited in the Light of Bargaining-Game Theory. International Journal of Industrial Organization 1: 1-21.

Aoki M. 1984. The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm. London: Oxford University Press.

Archibald G. C. 1987. The Theory of the Firm. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 357-62. London: Macmillan.

Aristoteles. 1950. The Politics of Aristotle, with an introduction, two prefatory essays, and notes, critical and explanatory, by W. L. Newman. Reprint. Oxford: Clarendon.359

Aron R. 1967. The Industrial Society. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Arrow K. J. 1962. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. In: National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Arrow K. J. 1969. The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-Market Allocation. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBB-System, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st sess., vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Arrow K. J. 1970. Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Amsterdam: North- Holland.

Arrow K. J. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York: W. W. Norton.

Arrow K.

J. 1979. The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information. In: M. J. Boskin, ed., Economics and Human Welfare: Essays in Honor ofTibor Scitovsky, 23-39. New York: Academic Press.

Arrow K. J. 1985a. Informational Structure of the firm. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 75: 303-7.

Arrow K. J. 1985b. The Economics of Agency. In: J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeck- hauser, eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 37-51.

Arrow K. J. 1994. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. American Economic Review 84: 1-9.

Auerbach N. Z. 1985. A Transactional Approach to Lease Analysis. Hofstra Law Review 13: 309-73.

Aumann, R. I. and S. Sorin. 1990. Cooperation and Bounded Recall. Games and Economic Behavior 1: 5-39.

Axelrod R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

Ayers I. and R. Gertner. 1991. Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules. Working Papers, no. 83. Stanford: Stanford Law School.

Azariadis C. 1975. Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria. Journal of Political Economy 83: 1183-1203.

Azariadis C. 1983. Employment with Asymmetric Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Supplement 98: 157-72.

Azariadis C. 1987. Implicit Contracts. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and R Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 733-37. London: Macmillan.

Azariadis C. and R. Cooper. 1985. Nominal Wage-Price Rigidity as a Rational Expectation Equilibrium. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 75: 31-35.

Azariadis C. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1983. Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Supplement 98: 1-22.

Backhaus D. 1979. ?konomik der Partizipativen Unternehmung. Tiibingen: Y. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Bailey M. J. 1974. Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand. Review of Economic Studies 41: 37-50.

Bain J.

1956. Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bain J. 1987. The Ratchet, Tautness, and Managerial Behavior in Soviet-Type Economies. European Economic Review 31: 1173-1201.

Bajt A. 1968. Property in Capital and in the Means of Production in Socialist Economies. Journal of Law and Economics 11: 1-4.

Baker G. P., M. C. Jensen and K. J. Murphy. 1988. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory. Journal of Finance 43: 593-616.

Baldwin R. 1985. The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Baltensperger E. 1987. Credit. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., •

The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1: 715-17. London: Macmillan.

Bamberg G. and K. Spremann. 1981. Implications of Constant Risk Aversion. Zeitschrift f?r Operations Research 25: 205-24.

Banfield E. C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York: Free Press.

Barnard С. [1938] 1962. The Functions of the Executive. 15th ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.360 Baron D. P. 1989. Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions. In: R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, 2: 1347-1447. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Baron D. P. and D. Besanko. 1987. Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship. Review of Economic Studies 54: 413-36.

Barro R. J. 1972, A Theory of Monopolistic Price Adjustment. Review of Economic Studies 39: 17-26.

Barro R. J. 1977. Long-Term Contracting, Sticky Prices, and Monetary Policy.

Journal of Monetary Economics 3: 305-16.

Barzel Y. 1982. Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets. Journal of Law and Economics 25: 27-48.

Barzel Y. 1984. The Entrepreneur’s Reward for Self-Policing. Economic Inquiry 25: 103-16.

Barzel Y. 1985, Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 141: 4-16.

Barzel Y. 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University Press.

Bates R.

H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bator F. 1957. The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, American Economic Review 47: 22-59.361 Batstone E. and P. Davies. 1976. Industrial Democracy: European Experience.

London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.

Baumol W. J. 1952. The Transaction Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 66: 545-56. \

Baumol W. J. 1959. Business Behavior, Value, and Growth. London: Macmillan. Baumol W. J. and R. D. Willig. 1981. Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of Monopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics 96: 405-31. Becker G. S. 1962. Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy 70: 1-13,

Becker G. S. 1965. A Theory of the Allocation of Time. Economic Journal 75: 493-517.362

Becker G. S. 1975. Human Capital. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Research. First edition, 1964.363

Becker G. S. and G. J. Stigler. 1974. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1-18.

Beckmann M. J. 1978. Rank in Organizations: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Berlin: Springer.

Beckmann M. J. 1988. Tinbergen Lectures on Organization Theory. Berlin: Springer.

Benham L. and P. Keefer. 1991. Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size, and Voter Heterogeneity. Economic Inquiry 29: 706-19.

Ben-Porath Y. 1980. The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange. Population and Development Review 6: 1-30.

Bentley A. F. 1949. The Process of Government. Evanston, III.: Principia.

Berle A. and G. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. London: Macmillan.

Berliner C. and J. A. Brimson. 1988. Cost Management for Today’s Advanced Manufacturing: The CAM-1 Conceptual Design. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Berliner J. S. 1957. Factory and Manager in the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bernheim D. and M. D. Whinston. 1985. Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion. Rand Journal of Economics 16: 269-81.

Bernholz P. 1965. Aufbewahrungs- und Transportkosten als Bestimmungsgr?nde der Geldnachfrage. Schweizerische Zeitschrift f?r Volkswirtschaft und Statis- tik 101: 1-15. \

Bernholz P. 1967. Erwerbskosten, Laufzeit, und Charakter zinstragender Forderungen als Bestimmungsgr?nde der Geldnachfrage der Haushalte. Zeitschrift f?r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 123: 9-24.

Bernholz P. 1985. The International Game of Power, Past, Present, and Future. Berlin: Mouton Press.

Bemholz P. 1992. The Economic Approach to International Relations. In: G. Rad- nitzky, ed., Universal Economics: Assessing the Achievements of the Economic Approach. New York: Paragon. 339-400.

Bernstein L. 1992. Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry. Journal of Legal Studies 21: 115-57.

Besanko D. and A. Thakor. 1987. Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets. International Economic Review 28: 671-89.

Besen S. M. and L. J. Raskind. 1991. An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1: 3-27.

Bils M. 1989. Pricing in a Customer Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 699-717.

Bindseil U. 1994. Verf?gungsrechte an organisierten Wertpapierm?rkten. Untersucht auf der Grundlage der Theorie unvollst?ndiger Vertr?ge. Ph.D. diss., Universit?t des Saarlandes, Saarbr?cken.

Binger B. R. and E. Hoffmann. 1989. Institutional Persistance and Change: The Question of Efficiency. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145: 67-84.

Binmore K. 1987. Modelling Rational Players I. Economics and Philosophy 3: 179-214.

Binmore K. 1988. Modelling Rational Players II. Economics and Philosophy 4: 9-55.

Binmore K. 1992. Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. Lexington, Mass.: D.

C. Heath.

Binmore K. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract I: Playing Fair. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Binmore K. and L. Samuelson. 1992. Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata. Journal of Economic Theory 57: 278-305.

Black D. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Black H. C. 1990. Black’s Law Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern, by J. R. Nolan and J. M. Nolan-Haley. 6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.

Blanchard*0. J. and S. Fischer. 1989. Lectures on Macroeconomics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Blau P. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley.

Blaug M. 1958. The Classical Economists and the Factory Acts: A Re-examination. Quarterly Journal of Economics 72: 211-26.

Blaug M. 1976. The Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory: A Slightly Jaundiced Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 14: 827-55.

Blaug M. 1985. Economic Theory in Retrospect. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.364

Blinder A. S. 1991. Why Are Prices Sticky? Preliminary Results from an Interview Study. American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings 81: 89-96.

B?hm F. 1937. Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtssch?pferische Leistung. Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer.

B?hm F., W. Eucken and H. Grossmann-Doerth. 1936. Vorwort der Herausgeber von F. Lutz, Das Grundproblem der Geldverfassung. Heft 2 der Schriftenreihe Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer.

B?hm-Bawerk E. 1881. Rechte und Verh?ltnisse vom Standpunkte der Volkswirtschaftlichen G?terlehre. Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagner’sehen Universit?ts-Buchhandlung.

Bonin J. P. 1985. Labor Management and Capital Maintenance: Investment Decisions in the Socialist Labor-Managed Firm. In: D. C. Jones and J. Svejnar, eds., Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, 1: 55-69. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.

Bonus H. 1991. Umweltpolitik in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Das Parlament, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. B10/91, 1 (March), 37-46. Bonn: Bundeszentrale f?r Politische Bildung.

Bonus H. 1992. Preis- und Mengenl?sungen in der Umweltpolitik. Jahrbuch f?r Sozialwissenschaft 41: 343-58.

Born stein M. 1979. Comparative Economic Systems—Models and Cases. Homewood, III.: Richard D. Irwin.

Bornstein M. and D. Fusfeld. 1970. The Soviet Economy: A Book of Readings. Homewood, III.: Irwin.

B?rsch-Supan A. 1986. On the West German Tenants’ Protection Legislation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142: 380-404.

B?ssmann E. 1978. Information. In: W. Albers et al., eds., Handw?rterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, 4: 184-200. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) and Vandenhoek and Ruprecht.

B?ssmann E. 1981. Weshalb gibt es Unternehmungen? Der Erkl?rungsansatz von Ronald H. Coase. Zeitschrift f?r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft/Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 137: 667-74.

Bowles S. 1985. The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models. American Economic Review 75: 16-36.

Bradley M. and L. M. Wakeman. 1983. The Wealth Effects of Targeted Share Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 310-28.

Brennan G. and J. M. Buchanan. 1985. The Reasons of Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brentano L. 1878. Die Arbeiter und die Produktionskrisen. Jahrbuch f?r Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft 2: 565-632.

Brunner K. and W. H. Meckling. 1977. The Perception of Man and the Conception of Government. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 3: 70-85.

Buchanan J. M. 1973. The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State. Natural Resources Journal 14: 579-94.

Buchanan J. M. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.365

Buchanan J. M. 1980a. Reform in a Rent Seeking Society. In: J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society, 359-67. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Buchanan J. M. 1980b. Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking. In: J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society, 3-15. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Buchanan J. M. 1987. Constitutional Economics. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1: 585-88. London et al.: Macmillan.

Buchanan J. M. 1990. The Domain of Constitutional Economics. Constitutional Political Economy 1: 1-18.366

Buchanan J. M., R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. 1980. Toward a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Buchanan J. M. and G. Tullok. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.367

B?cher K. 1922. Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft, Erste, und zweite Sammlung. T?bingen: H. Laupp’schen Buchhandlung.368

Buck T. 1982. Comparative Industrial Systems: Industry under Capitalism, Central Planning, and Self-Management. London: Macmillan.

Bull C. 1987. The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 147-59.

Burgers W. P., C. W. Hill and W. G. Kim. 1993. A Theory of Global Strategic Alliances: The Case of the Global Auto Industry. Strategic Management Journal 14: 419-32.

Butters G. 1977. Equilibrium Distribution of Prices and Advertising. Review of Economic Studies 44: 465-92.

Cable J. 1985. Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German Banks. Economic Journal 95: 118-32.

Calabresi G. 1970. The Costs of Accidents. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Calamari J. D. and J. M. Perillo. 1987. Contracts. 3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West.

Calvert R. L. 1995a. The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication. In: J. S. Banks and E. A. Ha- nushek, eds., Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, 216- 69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Calvert R. L. 1995b. Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions. In: J. Knight and I. Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions, 57-93. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Calvo G. A. 1978. Optimal Seigniorage from Money Creation: An Analysis of the Optimal Balance of Payments Deficit Problem. Journal of Monetary Economics 4: 503-17.

Calvo G. A. and S. Wellisz. 1979. Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution. Journal of Political Economy 87: 991-1010.

Carlton D. W. 1983. Equilibrium Fluctuations When Price and Delivery Lag Clear the Market. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 562-72.

Carlton D. W. 1986. The Rigidity of Prices. American Economic Review 76: 637-58.

Carlton D. W. 1989. The Theory and the Facts of How Markets Clear: Is Industrial Organization Valuable for Understanding Macroeconomics? In: R. Schmalen- see and R. D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1: 909-46. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Carmichael H. L. 1989. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4: 65-83.

Carr J. L. and J. T. Landa. 1983. The Economics of Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion. Journal of Legal Studies 12: 135-56.

Carr J. L. and F. Mathewson. 1990. The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm. Journal of Law and Economics 233: 307-30.

Chandler A. D., Jr. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Chen M.-J. and D. Miller. 1994. Competitive Attack, Retaliation, and Performance: An Expectancy-Valence Framework. Strategic Management Journal 15: 85-102.

Chen M.-J., K. G. Smith and C. M. Grimm. 1992. Action Characteristics as^ Predictors of Competitive Responses. Management Science 38: 439-55.

Cheung S. N. S. 1969. Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements. Journal of Law and Economics 12: 23-45.

Cheung S. N. S. 1970. The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Nonexclusive Resource. Journal of Law and Economics 13: 49-70.

Cheung S. N. S. 1974. A Theory of Price Control. Journal of Law and Economics 17: 53-71.

Cheung S. N. S. 1983. The Contractual Nature of the Firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 1-22.

Chung T.-Y. 1991. Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing. Review of Economic Studies 58: 1031-42.

Ciriacy-Wantrup S. V. and R. C. Bishop. 1975. «Common Property» as a Concept in Natural Resource Policy. Natural Resources Journal 15: 713-27. Clark C. W. 1977. The Economics of Over-exploitation. In: G. Hardin and J. Baden, eds., Managing the Commons, 82-95. San Francisco: Freeman.

Clarkson K. W. 1977. Intangible Capital and Rates of Return. Washington D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research.

Clausewitz C. von. [1832] 1963. Vom Kriege. Reinbeck: Rowohlt.369

Coase R. H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4: 386-405.370

Coase R. H. 1959. The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics 2: 1-40.

Coase R. H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44.371

Coase R. H. 1972. Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research. In: V. R. Fuchs, ed., Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, 59-73. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.372

Coase R. H. 1984. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 229-31.

Coase R. H. 1988a. R. H, Coase Lectures, 2: The Nature of the Firm—Meaning. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4: 19-32.373

Coase R. H. 1988b. The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.374

Coase R. H. 1993. Coase on Posner on Coase. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 96-98.

Coleman J. S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of Sociology» Supplement 94: 95-120.

Coleman J. S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Coleman J. S. 1991. Constructed Organization, First Principles. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 7-23.

Colson E. 1974. Tradition and Contract: The Problem of Order. Chicago: Aldine.

Commons J. R. 1934. Institutional Economics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Conlisk J. 1988. Optimization Cost. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9: 213-28.

Conlisk J. 1996. Why Bounded Rationality? Journal of Economic Literature 34: 669-700.

Cooper R. 1988a. The Rise of Activity-Based Costing* Part One: What Is an Activity-Based Cost System? Journal of Cost Management 2 (Summer): 45- 54.

Cooper R. 1988b. The Rise of Activity-Based Costing, Part Two: When Do I Need an Activity-Based Cost System? Journal of Cost Management 2 (Fall): 41-48.

Cooter R. and J. T. Landa. 1984. Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law. International Review of Law and Economics 4: 15-22.

Cooter R. and T. Ulen. 1988. Law and Economics. Glenview, III.: Scott, Fores- man.

Cournot A. 1838. Recherches sur les Principles Math?matiques de la Th?orie des Richesses. Paris: Riviere.

Crawford V. P. 1988. Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts. American Economic Review 78: 485-99.

Cremer J. 1986. Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101: 33-49.

Crocker K. J. and S. E. Masten. 1991. Pretia Ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics 34: 69-99.

Cyert R. M. and J. G. March. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firnf. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Dahlman C. J. 1979. The Problem of Externality. Journal of Law and Economics 22: 141-62.

Dann L. Y. and H. DeAngelo. 1983. Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchas.es, and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 275-300.

Dasgupta P. 1988. Trust as a Commodity. In: D. Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, 49-72. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Dasgupta P. and E. Maskin. 1986. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games I: Theory. Review of Economic Studies 53: 1-26.

Davis L., D. North. 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Day R. and M. Pingle. 1991. Economizing Economizing. Handbook of Behavioral Economics 2B: 511-24.

De Alessi L. 1980. The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence. Research in Law and Economics 2: 1-47.

De Alessi L. 1983. Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory. American Economic Review 73: 64-81.

De Alessi L. 1987. Property Rights and Privatization. In: S. Hanke, ed., Pros- pects for Privatization, 24-35. New York: Academy of Political Science.

De Alessi L. 1989. Subjective Value in Contract Law. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145: 561-77.

De Alessi L. 1990. Form, Substance, and Welfare Comparison in the Analysis of Institutions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 5- 23.

De Alessi L. 1992. Efficiency Criteria for Optimal Laws: Objective Standards of Value Judgements? Constitutional Political Economy 3: 321-42.

Debreu G. 1959. Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium. New York and London: Wiley.

De George R. T. 1990. Business Ethics. 3d ed. London: Macmillan.375

De Jasay A. 1989. Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problems. Oxford: Clarendon.

De Meza D. and J. P. Gould. 1992. The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights. Journal of Political Economy 100: 561-80.

Demsetz H. 1964. The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics 7: 11-26.

Demsetz H. 1966. Some Aspects of Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics 9: 61-70.

Demsetz H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 57: 347-59.

Demsetz H. 1968a. The Cost of Transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 82: 33-53.

Demsetz H. 1968b. Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11: 55-66.

Demsetz H. 1969. Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics 12: 1-22.

Demsetz H. 1982. Economic, Legal, and Political Dimensions of Competition. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Demski J. S. and D. E. M. Sappington. 1984. Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents. Journal of Economic Theory 33: 152-71.

Denzau A. T. and D. C. North. 1994. Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions. Kyklos 47: 3-31.

De Vany A. 1996. Information, Chance, and Evolution: Alchian and the Economics of Self-Organization. Economic Inquiry 34: 427-43.

Dewatripont M. F. 1986. On the Theory of Commitment with Applications to the Labor Market. Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, Department of Economics.

Diamond D. 1984. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Economic Studies 51: 393-414.

DiMaggio P. J. and W. W. Powell. 1991. Introduction. In: W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 1-38. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dnes A. W. 1992a. Franchising: A Case-Study Approach. Avebury: Aldershot.

Dnes A. W. 1992b. «Unfair» Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148: 484-504.

Dnes A. W. 1996. The Economic Analysis of Franchise Contracts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152: 1-28.

Domar E. D. 1966. The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Cooperative. American Economic Review 56: 734-57.

Dorfman R. and P. O. Steiner. 1954. Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality. American Economic Review 44: 826-45.

Downs A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Dreier R. 1986. Der Begriff des Rechts. Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 14: 890-96.

Dreze J. H. 1976. Some Theories of Labor Management and Participation. Econometric a 44: 1125-40.

Drobak J. N. and J. V. C. Nye, eds. 1997. The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. San Diego: Academic Press.

Diirig G. 1958. Eigentum. In: Staatslexikon, 6th ed. Freiburg.

Dwarkin R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth.

Dye R. 1985. Costly Contract Contingencies. International Economic Review 26:

233-50.

Eaton B. and D. Eaton. 1988. Microeconomics. New York: W. H. Freeman.

Eekhoff J. 1981. Zur Kontroverse um die ?konomischen Auswirkungen des Zweiten Wohnraumk?ndigungsschutzgesetzes. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 137: 62-77.

Eggertsson T. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.376

EIRR 1990. Employee Participation in Europe. European Industrial Relations Review. Reports no. 4. London: Eclipse.

Eisenhardt K. M. and M. J. Zbaracki. 1992. Strategic Decision Making. Strategic Management Journal 13: 17-37.

Ellickson R. C. 1987. A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control. Journal of Legal Studies 16: 67-100.

Elster J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Elster J. 1989. The Cement of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eser G. 1994. Europarechtliche Aspekte der Arbeitermitbestimmung in Multinationalen Unternehmen. Arbeit und Recht Heft 3: 91-100.

Etzioni A. 1988. The Moral Dimension. New York: Free Press.

Eucken W. 1940. Wissenschaft im Stile Schmollers. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 52: 468-506.

Eucken W. 1947. Die Grundlagen der National?konomie. 2d ed. Godesberg: Helmut K?pper, vormals Georg Bondi.377

Eucken W. 1950. The Foundations of Economics. Translated by T. W. Hutchison. Edinburgh: Hodge.

Eucken W. 1951. The Unsuccessful Age. Edinburgh: Hodge.

Eucken W. 1952. Grunds?tze der Wirtschaftspolitik. Edited by E. Eucken and K. P. Hensel. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).378

Fama E. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88: 288-307.

Fama E. and M. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-25.

Farnsworth E. A. 1990. Contracts. 2d ed. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown.

Farrell J. 1987. Information and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Economic Perspectives I, no. 2: 113-29.

Farrell J. and G. Saloner. 1985. Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation. Rand Journal of Economics 16: 70-83.

Fellner W. 1949. Competition among the Few: Oligopoly and Similar Market Structures. New York: Knopf.

Fischer S. 1977. Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule. Journal of Political Economy 85: 191-205.

Fisher F. M. and J. J. McGowan. 1983. On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits. American Economic Review 73: 83-98.

Fisher I. 1912. The Nature of Capital and Income. New York and London: Macmillan.

Flath D. 1980. The Economics of Short-Term Leasing. Economic Inquiry. 18: 247-59.

Foley D. K. 1970. Economic Equilibrium with Costly Marketing. Journal of Economic Theory 2: 276-91. Frank R. H. 1990. A Theory of Moral Sentiments. In: J. J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest, 71-96. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Frank R. H. 1992. Melding Sociology and Economics: James Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory. Journal of Economic Literature 30: 147-70.

Fr?se R. 1966. Comments on Hurt and Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright. American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings 56: 435- 39.

Freixas X., R. Guesnerie and J. Tirole. 1985. Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect. Review of Economic Studies 52: 173-91.

Frey B. S. 1984a. International Political Economy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Frey B. S. 1984b. A New View of Economics: Comparative Analysis of Institutions. Economia della Scelte Pubbliche 1: 3-16.

Frey B. S. 1993. An Economic Analysis of the New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 351-59.

Frey B. S. and F. Schneider. 1981. Central Bank Behavior: A Positive Empirical Analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 1: 291-315.

Fried C. 1981. Contract as a Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Frieden J. A. and D. A. Lake, eds. 1987. International Political Economy. New \ York: St. Martin’s.

Friedman D. 1977. A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations. Journal of Political Economy 85-1: 59-77.

Friedman M. 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fr?hlich W. 1940. Das afrikanische Markt wesen. Zeitschrift f?r Ethnologie 72:

234-328.

Fudenberg D., B. R. Holmstrom and P. Milgrom. 1990. Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships. Journal of Economic Theory 51: 1-31.

Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Furubotn E. G. 1963. On Some Applications of the Utility Tree. Southern Economic Journal 30: 128-43.

Furubotn E. G. 1971a. Economic Organization and Welfare Distribution. Swedish Journal of Economics 73: 409-16.

Furubotn E. G. 1971b. Toward a Dynamic Model of the Yugoslav Firm. Cana- dian Journal of Economics 4: 182-97.

Furubotn E. G. 1974a. Bank Credit and the Labor-Managed Firm: The Yugoslav Case. In: E. G. Furubotn and S. Pejovich, eds., The Economics of Property Rights. 257-76. Cambridge: Ballinger.

Furubotn E. G. 1974b. The Quasi-Concave Utility Function and the Number of Distinct Commodities Chosen at Equilibrium. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 110: 228-307. Furubotn E. G. 1976a. The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm: An Alternative Interpretation. American Economic Review 66: 104-23.

Furubotn E. G. 1976b. Worker Alienation and the Structure of the Firm. In:

S. Pejovich, ed., Government Controls and the Free Market. 195-225. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Furubotn E. G. 1978. The Economic Consequences of Codetermination on the Rate and Sources of Private Investment. In: S. Pejovich, ed., The Codetermination Movement in the West: Labor Participation in the Management of Business Firms, 131-67. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath.

Furubotn E. G. 1980. The Socialist Labor-Managed Firm and Bank Financed Investment: Some Theoretical Issues. Journal of Comparative Economics 4: 184-91.

Furubotn E. G. 1985. Codetermination Productivity Gains and the Economics of the Firm. Oxford Economic Papers 37: 22-39.

Furubotn E. G. 1986. Efficiency and the Maximization Postulate: Another Interpretation. Journal of Behavioral Economics 15: 41-48.

Furubotn E. G. 1987. Privatizing the Commons: Comment. Southern Economic Journal 54: 219-24.

Furubotn E, G. 1988. Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A Property-Rights Analysis. Journal of Business 61: 165-81.

Furubotn E. G. 1989a. Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145: 25-31.

Furubotn E. G. 1989b. Organizational Economics and the Analysis of Codetermination. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 60: 463-74.

Furubotn E. G. 1990. Different Approaches to the Economic Analysis of Institutions: Some Concluding Remarks. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 226-32.

Furubotn E.G. 1991. General Equilibrium Models, Transaction Costs, and the Concept of Efficient Allocation in a Capitalist Economy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 147: 662-86.

Furubotn E. G. 1994. Future Development of the New Institutional Economics: Extension of the Neoclassical Model or New Construct? Lectiones Jenens- es 1: 3-42.

Furubotn E. G. 1995. Income Transfers, Entrepreneurial Effort, and the Coase Theorem: The Case for Efficiency Reconsidered. European Journal of Law and Economics 2: 99-118.

Furubotn E. G. 1996. The Neoclassical Production Function: Useful Construct or Red Herring? Unpublished manuscript. Center for the Study of the New Institutional Economics. Universit?t des Saarlandes, Saarbr?cken, Germany.

Furubotn E. G. and S. Pejovich. 1970a. Tax Policy and Investment Decisions of the Yugoslav Firm. National Tax Journal 23: 335-48.

Furubotn E. G. and S. Pejovich. 1970b. Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of Yugoslavia. Zeitschrift f?r National?konomie 30: 431-54.

Furubotn E. G. and S. Pejovich. 1972a. Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature. Journal of Economic Literature 10: 1137-62.

Furubotn E. G. and S. Pejovich. 1972b. The Soviet Manager and Innovation: A Behavioral Model of the Soviet Firm. Revue De UEst 3: 29-45.

Furubotn E. G. and S. Pejovich, eds. 1974. The Economics of Property Rights. Cambridge, Mass.: Balinger.

Furubotn E.G. and S. Pejovich. 1991. The Role of the Banking System in Yugoslav Economic Planning, 1946-1969. Revue Internationale D'Historie De La Banque 4: 51-91.

Furubotn E.G. and R. Richter. 1991. The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment. In: E. G. Furubotn and R. Richter, eds., The New Institutional Economics, 1-32. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Furubotn E. G. and R. Richter. 1994. The New Institutional Economics: Bounded Rationality and the Analysis of State and Society. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 1-34.

Furubotn E. G. and S. N. Wiggins. 1984. Plant Closings, Worker Reallocation Costs, and Efficiency Gains to Labor Representation on Boards of Directors. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 176-92.

Galbraith J. K. 1952. American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Galbraith J. K. 1967. The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.379

Garrett G. and B. R. Weingast. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market. In: J. Goldshein and R. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy, 173-206. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.

Garvy G. 1944. Rivals and Interlopers in the History of the New York Security Market. Journal of Political Economy 52: 128-43.

Gibbons R. 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. New York: Harvester.

Gifford A., Jr. 1991. A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm. Public Choice 68: 91-106.

Gilpin R. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gilson R. J. and R. H. Mnookin. 1989. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns. Stanford Law Review 41:

567-95.

Goetz C. J. and R. E. Scott. 1981. Principles of Relational Contracts. Virginia Law Review 67: 1089-1150. \

Goldberg V. 1976. Regulation and Administered Contracts. Bell Journal of Economics 7: 426-52.

Goldberg V. 1980. Relational Exchange: Economic and Complex Contracts. American Behavioral Scientist 23: 337-46.

Goldberg V. 1990. Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 216-22.

Gordon D. F. 1974. A Neoclassical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment. Economic Inquiry 12: 431-49.

Gordon H. S. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62: 124-42.

Gossen H. H. [1854] 1889. Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs. New ed. Berlin: Prager.

Gottinger H. 1982. Computational Costs and Bounded Rationality. In: W. Steg- muller, W. Balzer and W. Spohn, eds., Studies in Contemporary Economics, 223-38. Berlin: Springer.

Gould J. P. 1968. Adjustment Costs in the Theory of Investment of the Firm. Review of Economic Studies 35: 47-55.

Gould J. P. 1980. The Economics of Markets: A Simple Model of the Market- Making Process. Journal of Business 53: 167-87. I

Grandmont J. M. 1974. On the Short Run Equilibrium in a Monetary Economy. In: J. Dreze, ed., Allocation under Uncertainty, Equilibrium, and Optimality, 213-28. Proceedings of an International Economic Association Workshop in Economic Theory, Bergen, Norway. London: Macmillan.

Grandmont J. M. 1977. Temporary General Equilibrium Theory. Econometrica 45: 535-72.

Grandmont J. M. and Y. Younes. 1972. On the Role of Money and the Existence of a Monetary Equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 39: 355-72.

Grandmont J. M. and Y. Younes. 1973. On the Efficiency of a Monetary Equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 40: 149-65.

Granovetter M. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-501.

Gravelle H. and R. Rees. 1987. Microeconomics. London: Longman.

Green J. R. and J. J. Laffont. 1979. Incentives in Public Decision-Making. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Green M., et al. 1979. The Case for a Corporate Democracy Act of 1980. Public Citizens* Congress Watch. Washington, D.C., 1-127.

Greenwald B. C. 1986. Adverse Selection in the Labour Market. Review of Economic Studies 53: 325-48.

Greif A. 1989. Reputation and Coalitions on Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders. Journal of Economic History 49: 857-82.

Greif A. 1994. On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. Journal of Economic History 54: 271-87.

Greif A. 1997a. Microtheory and Recent Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions Through Economic History. In: D. M. Kreps and K. F. Wallis, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application. Proceedings of the Seventh World Congress of the Econometrics Society, Vol. Ill, 79-113. Cambridge University Press.

Greif A. 1997b. On the Interrelations and Economic Implications of Economic, Social, Political, and Normative Factors: Reflections from Two Late Medieval Societies. In: S. N. Drobak and J. V. C. Nye, eds., The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics, 57-94. San Diego: Academic Press.

Greif A., P. Milgrom and B. R. Weingast. 1990. The Merchant Gild as a Nexus of Contracts. Working Papers in Economics, no. E-90-23. Palo Alto: Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Grossman G. and C. Shapiro. 1984. Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products. Review of Economic Studies 51: 63-82.

Grossman S. J. 1981. The Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24: 461-83.

Grossman S. J. and O. D. Hart. 1981. Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 71: 301 — 07.

Grossman S. J. and O. D. Hart. 1982. Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives. In: J. J. McCall, ed., The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, 107-40. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Grossman S. J. and O. D. Hart. 1983a. An Analysis of the Principal Agjent Problem. Econometrica 51: 7-46.

Grossman S. J. and O. D. Hart. 1983b. Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Supplement 98: 123-56.

Grossman S. J. and O. D. Hart. 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-719.

Grossman S. J. and O. D. Hart. 1987. Vertical Integration and the Distribution of Property Rights. In: A. Razin, eds., Economic Policy and Practice. London: Macmillan.

Grout P. 1984. Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach. Econometrica 52: 449-60.

Gwartney J., R. Lawson and W. Block. 1995. Economic Freedom of the World, 1975-1995. Vancouver: Fraser Institute.

Haas D. and Deseran F. A. 1981. Trust and Symbolic Exchange. Social Psychology Quarterly 44: 3-13.

Hadfield G. K. 1990. Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts. Stanford Law Review 42: 927-92.

Hahn F. H. 1971. Equilibrium with Transaction Costs. Econometrica 39: 417-39.

Hahn F. H. 1973. On Transaction Costs, Inessential Sequence Economics, and Money. Review of Economic Studies 40: 449-61.

Hall R. E. and E. P. Lazear. 1984. The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand. Journal of Labour Economics 2: 231-57.

Hamilton G. G. and R. C. Feenstra. 1995. Varieties of Hierarchies and Markets: An Introduction. Industrial and Corporate Change 4: 51-92.

Hansmann H. 1988. Ownership of the Firm. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4: 267-304.

Hardin G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162: 1243-48.

Harsanyi J. 1967. Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players I: The Basic Model. Management Science 14: 159-82.

Hart H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hart O. D. 1983a. Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction. Review of Economic Studies 50: 3-35.

Hart O. D. 1983b. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 366-82.

Hart O. D. 1987. Incomplete Contracts. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 752-59. London: Macmillan.

Hart O. D. 1989. An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm. Columbia Law Review 89: 1757-74.

Hart O. D. 1990. Is «Bounded Rationality» an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 696- 702.

Hart O. D. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hart O. D. and B. R. Holmstrom. 1987. The Theory of Contracts. In: T. Bqwley, ed., Advances in Economic Theory, 71-155. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hart O. D. and J. Moore. 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econo- metrica 56: 755-85.

Hart O. D. and J. Moore. 1989. Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt. Mimeo.

Hart O. D. and J. Moore. 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 98: 1119-58.

Haucap J., C. Wey and J. Barmbold. 1995. Location Choice and Implicit Franchise Contracts. Discussion Papers, no. 9506. Department of Economics, University of Saarland.

Hausman D. M. 1989. Economic Methodology in a Nutshell. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3: 115-27.

Hax H. 1996. Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151: 182-85.

Hayek F. A., ed. 1935. Collectivist Economic Planning. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hayek F. A. 1937. Economics and Knowledge. Economica 4: 35-54.

Hayek F. A. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.380

Hayek F. A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 35: 519-30.381

Hayek F. A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hayek F. A. 1973. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek F. A. 1978. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Economic Ideas. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Heller W. P 1972. Transitions with Set-up Costs. Journal of Economic Theory 4: 465-78.

Hellwig M. 1987. Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection. European Economic Review 31: 319-25.

Hellwig M. 1988a. Kreditrationierung und Kreditsicherheiten bei asymmetrischer Information: Der Fall des Monopolmarkets. Discussion Papers, no. A-167, Universit?t Basel.

Hellwig M. 1988b. Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144: 200-207.

Hellwig M. 1989. Asymmetric Information, Financial Markets, and Financial Institutions. European Economic Review 33: 277-85.

Hemmer T. 1995. On the Interrelation between Production Technology, Job Design, and Incentives. Journal of Accounting & Economics 19: 209^45.

Henderson J. M. and R. E. Quandt. 1958. Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach. New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw Hill.

Hennart J.-F. 1988. A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures. Strategic Management Journal 9: 361-74.

Hennart J.-F. 1991. The Transaction Costs Theory of Joint Ventures: An Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries in the United States. Management Science 37: 483-97.

Hermalin B. E. and M. L. Katz. 1991. Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency. Econometrica 59: 1735-53.

Hess J. D. 1983. The Economics of Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Hicks J. R. 1932. The Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan.

Hicks J. R. 1935. A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money. Economica n.s., 2: 1-19. Reprinted in F. A. Lutz and L. W. Mints, eds., Readings in Monetary Theory, 13-32. New York, Philadelphia, and Toronto: Blakiston Company, 1951.

Hicks J. R. 1946. Value and Capital: An Inquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon.382

Hicks J. R. 1956, A Revision of Demand Theory. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hicks J. R. 1967. The Two Triads, Lecture I. In: Critical Essays in Monetary Theory, 1-16. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hinds M. 1990. Issues in the Introduction of Market Forces in Eastern European Socialist Economies. World Bank Reports, no. IDP-0057. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Hippel E. von. 1963. Die Kontrolle der Vertragsfreiheit nach anglo-amerikanis- chem Recht. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

Hirschman A. O. 1969. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hirshleifer J. 1973. Exchange Theory: The Missing Chapter. Western Economic Journal 11: 129-46.

Hirshleifer J. and J. G. Riley. 1979. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Intermediation: An Expositary Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 17: 1375- 1421.

Hodgson G. 1982, Theoretical and Policy Implications of Variable Productivity. Cambridge Journal of Economics 6: 213-26.

Hoff T. 1981. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society. Indianapolis: Liberty.

Holcombe R. G. 1994. The Economic Foundations of Government. London: Macmillan. -

Holmstrom B. R. 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.

Holmstrom B. R. 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 324-40.

Holmstrom B. R. 1983. Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Supplement 98: 23-54.

Holmstrom B. R. and P. Milgrom. 1987. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. Econometrica. 55: 303-28.

Holmstrom B. R. and P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 24-52.

Holmstrom B. R. and J. Ricart i Costa. 1986. Managerial Incentives and Capital Management. Quarterly Journal of Economics 97: 835-60.

Holmstrom B. R. and J. Tirole. 1989. The Theory of the Firm. In: R. Schma- lensee and R. D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1: 63- 133. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Holmstrom B. R. and J. Tirole. 1991. Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 201-28.

Homann K. and F. Blome-Drees. 1992. Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik. UTB f?r Wissenschaft. G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck.

Homans G. C. 1950. The Human Group. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Homans G. C. 1958. Social Behaviour as Exchange. American Journal of Sociology 62: 606-27.

Horn N., H. K?tz and H. G. Leser. 1982. German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon.

Horvat B. 1971. Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institutional Developments. American Economic Review, Supplement 61: 69-169.

Horvat B., M. Markovic and R* Supek, eds. 1975. Self-Governing Socialism: A Reader. White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press.

Hughes A. 1987. Managerial Capitalism. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 3: 293-96. London: Macmillan.

Hughes J. 1988. The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Georgetown Law Review 77: 287-366.

Humboldt W. von. [1792] 1967. Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, Jr.

Hume D. [1739-40] 1969. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by E. C. Moss- ner. London: Penguin.383

Hurwicz L. 1960. Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Alloca- tion Mechanisms. In: K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 27-46. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hurwicz L. 1973. The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 63: 1-30.

Hurwicz L. 1986. Incentive Aspects of Decentralization. In: K. J. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Mathematical Economics. 3: 1441-82. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Hutchison T. W. 1953. A Review of Economic Doctrines. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hutchison T. W. 1978. On Revolutions and Progress in Economic Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchison T. W. 1979. Notes on the Effects of Economic Ideas of the German Social Market Economy. Zeitschrift f?r die gesamte StaatswissenschaftlJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 135: 424-41.

Hutchison T. W. 1984. Institutionalist Old and New. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 20-29.

IDE [Industrial Democracy in Europe. International Research Group]. 1993. Industrial Democracy in Europe Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ireland N. and P. Law. 1982. The Economics of Labour-Managed Enterprises. London: Croom Helm.

Isaac M. R. and J. M. Walker. 1988. Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Economic Inquiry 26: 585-608.

Itoh H. 1992. Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8: 321-45.

Jaffee D. M. and T. Russell. 1976. Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 651-66.

Jehle E. 1982. Gemeinkosten-Management. Die Unternehmung 36, no. 1: 59-76.

Jensen M. C. 1983. Organization Theory and Methodology. Accounting Review 58: 319-39.

Jensen M. C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 76: 323-29.

Jensen M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-60. Reprinted in Putterman 1986a, 209-29.384

Jensen M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1979. Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination. Journal of Business 52: 469-506.

Jensen M. C. and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-64.

Johnson R. N. and G. D. Libecap. 1994a. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

Johnson R. N. and G. D. Libecap. 1994b. Patronage to Merit and Control of the Federal Government Labor Force. Explorations in Economic History 31: 91-

119.

Jones D. and J. Svejnar, eds. 1989-92. Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms. Vols. 1-4, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI.

Joskow P. L. 1985a. Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 33-80.

Joskow P. L. 1985b. Long Term Vertical Relationships and the Study of Industrial Organization and Government Regulation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 141: 586-93.

Joskow P. L. 1988. Asset Specificity and Structure of Vertical Relationship: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4: 95-118.

Kagel J. and R. Battalio. 1975. Experimental Studies of Consumer Behavior Using Laboratory Animals. Economic Inquiry 13: 22-38.

Kahneman D. 1994. New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 18-36.

Kaldor N. 1950. The Economic Aspects of Advertising. Review of Economic Studies 18: 1-27.

Kennan J. and R. Wilson. 1993. Bargaining with Private Information. Journal of Economic Literature 31: 45-104.

Kenney R. W. and B. Klein. 1983. The Economics of Block Booking. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 497-540.

Keohane R. O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keynes J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: Macmillan.385

Kirzner I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Klein B. 1980. Transaction Cost Determinants of «Unfair» Contractual Arrangements. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 70: 356-62.

Klein B. 1985. Self-Enforcing Contracts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 141: 594-600.

Klein B., R. G. Crawford and A. A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics 28: 297-326.386

Klein B. and K. B. Leffler. 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. Journal of Political Economy 89: 615-41.

Knight F. 1922. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. New York: Harper and Row.387

Knight J. and I. Sened, eds. 1995. Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Koopmans T. 1957. Three Essays on The State of Economic Science. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Krahnen J. P. 1990. Objektfinanzierung und Vertragsgestaltung. Eine theoretische Erkl?rung der Struktur langfristiger Leasingvertr?ge. Zeitschrift f?r Betriebswirtschaftslehre 60: 21-38.

Krahnen J. P. and G. Meran. 1989. Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis. In: G. Bamberg and K. Spremann, eds., Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, 255-80. Heidelberg: Springer.

Kranton R. E. 1996. The Formation of Cooperative Relationships. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12: 214-33.

Kreps D. M. 1990a. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. In: J. E. Alt and K. A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, 90-143. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kreps D. M. 1990b. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. New York: Harvester.

Kreps D. M. 1990c. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Clarendon.

Kreps D. M., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson. 1982. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 245-52.

Kreps D. M. and R. Wilson. 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 253-7,9.388

Kronman A. T. 1985. Contract Law and the State of Nature. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 5-32.

Kydland F. E. and E. C. Prescott. 1977. Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-91.

La Croix S. J. 1989. Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity? Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5: 211-22.

Laffont J. J. 1989. The Economics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Laffont J. J. and E. Maskin. 1982. The Theory of Incentives: An Overview. In: W. Hildenbrand, ed., Advances in Economic Theory, 31-94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laffont J. J. and J. Tirole. 1986. Using Cost Observations to Regulate Firms. Journal of Political Economy 94: 614-41.

Laffont J. J. and J. Tirole. 1988. The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts. Econo- metrica 56: 1153-75.

Lambert R. A. 1983. Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 441-52.

Lancaster K. 1966a. Change and Innovation in the Technology of Consumption. American Economic Review 56: 14-23.389

Lancaster K. 1966b. A New Approach to Consumer Technology. Journal of Political Economy 74: 132-57.

Lancaster K. 1969. Introduction to Modern Microeconomics. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Landa J. T. 1981. A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law. Journal of Legal Studies 10: 349-62.

Landes W. M. and R. A. Posner. 1987. Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective. Journal of Law and Economics 30: 265-309.

Landes W. M. and R. A. Posner. 1989. An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law. Journal of Legal Studies 18: 325-66.

Lange O. 1938. On the Economic Theory of Socialism. In: O. Lange, F. M. Taylor and B. E. Lippincott, eds., On the Economic Theory of Socialism, 57-143. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Langlois R. N. 1982. Economics as a Process. New York University.

Langlois R. N. 1986. The New Institutional Economics: An Introductionary Essay. In: R. N. Langlois, ed., Economics as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics, 1-26. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Larenz K. 1982. Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts. 1. Band: Allgemeiner Teil, 2. Band: Besonderer Teil. Munich: Beck.

Latham E. 1952. The Group Basis of Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Lawson F. H. and B. Rudden. 1982. The Law of Property. Oxford: Clarendon.

Lazear E. P. 1979. Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? Journal of Political Economy 87: 1261-84.

Lazear E. P. 1981. Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions. American Economic Review 71: 606-20.

Lazear E. P. 1987. Incentive Contracts. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 744-48. London: Mac-millan.

Lazear E. P. 1989. Pay Equality and Industrial Politics. Journal of Political Economy 97: 561-80.

Lazear E. P. 1991. Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 2: 89-110.

Lazear E. P. and S. Rosen. 1981. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89: 841-64.

Leibenstein H. 1966. Allocative Efficiency vs. «X-Efficiency.» American Economic Review 56: 392-415.390

Leibenstein H. 1979. A Branch of Economics Is Missing: Micro-Micro Theory. Journal of Economic Literature 17: 477-502.

Leibenstein Н. 1985. On Relaxing the Maximization Postulate. Journal of Behavioral Economics 14: 5-19.

Leland H. E. and D. H. Pyle. 1977. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance 32: 371-87.

Levi M. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lewis D. 1969. Convention: A Philisophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Libecap G. D. 1989a. Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145: 6-24.

Libecap G. D. 1989b. Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Libecap G. D. and S. N. Wiggins. 1985. The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of 0[\ Field Unitization. Journal of Political Economy 93: 690-714.

Lindenberg S. 1988. Contractual Relations and Weak Solidarity: The Behavioral Basis of Restraints on Gain-Maximization. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144: 39-58.

Llewellyn K. N. 1931-32. What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective. Yale Law Journal 40: 704-51.

Locke J. 1823. Two Treaties of Government: In the Former, the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and His Followers, Are Detected and Overthrown; the Latter is an Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government. In The Works of John Locke, 5. London: J. M. Dent and Sons. Reprint, Aalen: Scientia Verlag. 1963.391

Luhmann N. 1984. Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Ma C.-Т., J. Moore and S. Turnbull. 1988. Stopping Agents from «Cheating». Journal of Economic Theory 46: 355-72.

Macaulay S. 1963. Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review 28: 55-67.

Macey J. and H. Kanda. 1990. The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York Stock Exchange. Cornell Law Review 75: 1007-52.

Macneil I. R. 1974. The Many Futures of Contracts. Southern California Law Review 47: 691-816.

Macneil I. R. 1978. Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law. Northwestern University Law Review 72: 854-905.

Macneil I. R. 1980. The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Macneil I. R. 1983. Values in Contract: Internal and External. Northwestern University Law Review 79: 340-418.

Mailath G. J. and A. Postlewaite. 1990. Asymmetric Information: Bargaining Problems with Many Agents. Review of Economic Studies 57: 351-67.

Malcomson J. M. and F. Spinnewyn. 1988. The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem. Review of Economic Studies 55: 391-408.

Manne H. G. 1965. Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy 73: 110-20.

Manne H. G. 1967. Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics. Virginia Law Review 53: 259-85.

March J. G. and J. P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.

Marris R. 1964. The Economic Theory of «Managerial» Capitalism. London: Macmillan. *

Marris R. 1974. The Corporate Society. London: Macmillan.

Marris R. 1987. Corporate Economy. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1: 671-75. London: Macmillan.

Marris R. and D. C. Mueller. 1980. The Corporation, Competition, and the In- visible Hand. Journal of Economic Literature 18: 32-63.

Marris R. and A. Wood, eds. 1971. The Corporate Economy: Growth, Competition, and Innovation Potential. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Marschak J. 1971. Economics of Information Systems. In: M. D. Intriligator, ed., Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, 32-107. Amsterdam: North-Hol- land.

Marschak J. 1979. Efficient Organizational Design. In: H. I. Greenfield, et al., eds., Economic Theory for Economic Efficiency: Essays in Honor of A. P. Ler- ner, 110-19. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Marschak T. 1986. Organization Design. In: K. J. Arrow and M. D. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Mathematical Economics, 3: 1359-1440. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Marschak T. and R. Radner. 1971. Economic Theory of Teams. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Marshall A. 1920. Principles of Economics. 8th ed. London: Macmillan.392

Martin D. L. 1972. Job Property Rights and Job Defections. Journal of Law and Economics 15: 385-410.

Martin D. L. 1977. The Economics of Employment Termination Rights. Journal of Law and Economics 20: 187-204.

Martin D. L. 1993. Costs, Credibility, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. World Politics 45: 406-32.

Martinek M. 1987. Franchising—Grundlagen der zivil- und wettbewerbsrechtlichen Behandlung der vertikalen Gruppenkooperation bei Absatz von Waren und Dienstleistungen. Heidelberg: V. Decker.

Martinek M. 1991. Moderne Vertragstypen. Band I: Leasing und Factoring. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Martinek M. 1992. Moderne Vertragstypen. Band II: Franchising, Know-How - Vertr?ge, Management- und Consultingvertr?ge. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Martinek M. 1993. Moderne Vertragstypen. Band III: Computervertr?ge, Kreditkartenvertr?ge sowie sonstige moderne Vertragstypen. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Marx K. and F. Engels. 1848. Kommunistisches Manifest. London: N.p., printed in the office of «Bildungsanstalt f?r Arbeiter» of D. E. Burghard.393

Mason D. 1992. Attitudes towards the Market and the State in Post-Communist Europe. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, Arizona.

Masten S., ed. 1996. Case Studies in Contracting and Organization. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Masulis R. 1987. Changes in Ownership Structure: Conversions of Mutual Savings and Loans to Stock Charter. Journal of Financial Economics 18: 29-59.

Matthews R. C. O. 1986. The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth. Economic Journal 96: 903-18.

Mayer T. 1993. Friedman’s Methodology of Positive Economics: A Soft Reading. Economic Inquiry 31: 213-23.

Mayers D. and C. Smith. 1986. Ownership Structure and Control: The Mutualization of Stock Life Insurance Companies. Journal of Financial Eco- nomics 16: 73-98.

Maynes E. S. 1976. Decision-Making for Consumers: An Introduction to Consumer Economics. London: Macmillan.

McCain R. 1980. A Theory of Codetermination. Zeitschrift f?r National?konomie 40: 65-90.

McCubbins M. D., R. G. Noll and B. R. Weingast. 1989. Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. Working Papers, no. P-89-4, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

McGuire M. C. and M. Olson, Jr. 1996. The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force. Journal of Economic Literature 34: 72-96.

McKean R. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.

McManus J. 1972. An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North American Fur Trade. Journal of Economic History 32: 36-53.

Meade J. 1972. The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing. Economic Journal, Supplement 82: 402-28.

Meade J. 1986. Alternative Systems of Business Organization and of Workers' Remuneration. London: Alien and Unwin.

Medicus D. 1985. Schuldrecht II. Besonderer Teil. 2d ed. Munich: Beck.

Medicus D. 1992. Schuldrecht I. Allgemeiner Teil. 6th ed. Munich: Beck.

Mehren A. T. von and J. R. Gordley. 1977. The Civil Law System. 2d ed. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown.

Melumad N., D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein. 1992. A Theory of Responsibility Centers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15: 445-84.

Menell P. S. 1991. The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental Risks. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 3: 93-113.

Menger C. [1883] 1963. Problems of Economics and Sociology. Translated by F. J. Nock from the German edition of 1883. Edited by L. Schneider. Urba- na: University of Illinois Press.

Menger C. 1884. Die Irrtiimer des Historismus. Vienna: Hoelder.

Merryman J. H. 1974. Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson). Tulane Law Review 48: 916-45.

Merryman J. H. 1985. The Civil Law' Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal System of Western Europe and Latin America. 2d ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Merton R. 1949. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.

Michael R. and G. S. Becker. 1973. On the New Theory of Consumer Behavior. Swedish Journal of Economics 75: 378-96.

Milde H. and J. G. Riley. 1988. Signalling in Credit Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 101-29.

Milgrom P. R., D. C. North and B. R. Weingast. 1989. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and tfie Cam- pagne Fairs. Economics and Politics 2: 1-23.

Milgrom P. and J. Roberts. 1982. Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 280-312.

Milgrom P. and J. Roberts. 1986. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality. Journal of Political Economy 94: 796-821.394

Milgrom P. and J. Roberts. 1987. Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 77: 184-93.

Milgrom P. and J. Roberts. 1988. An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations. American Journal of Sociology 94: 154-79.

Milgrom P. and J. Roberts. 1990a. Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity. In: J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, 57-89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Milgrom P. and J. Roberts. 1990b. The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization. American Economic Review 80: 511-28.395 Mill J. S. [1848] 1902. Principles of Political Economy. London: Longmans, Green.396

Mill J. S. 1857. Principles of Economics. 4th ed. London: Parker.

Miller G. J. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Miller G. P. 1989. Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine. California Law Review 77: 83-131.

Miller G. P. 1993. The Industrial Organization of Political Production: A Case Study.

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 769-74.

Miller J, G. and Т. E. Vollmann. 1985. The Hidden Factory. Harvard Business Review 55, no. 5: 142-50.

Mills F. C. 1927. The Behavior of Prices. New York: National Bureau of Eco- nomic Research.

Mincer J. 1958. Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution.

Journal of Political Economy 66: 2Я1-302.

Minsky M. 1967. Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.

Mirrlees J. A. 1974. Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty. In: M. S. Balch, D. L. McFadden and S. Y. Wu, eds., Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, 243-58. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Mirrlees J. A. 1976. The Optimal Structure of Incentives with Authority within an Organization. Bell Journal of Economics 7: 105-31.

Mises L. von. [1920] 1935. Economic Calculation in a Socialist Commonwealth. In: F. A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning, 87-130. London: Rout- ledge and Kegan Paul.

Mises L. von. [1932] 1981. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics. Translation of L. Mises, Die Gemeinwirtschaft, 2d ed. Munich: Philosophia.397

Mnookin R. H. and L. Kornhauser. 1979. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce. Yale Law Journal 88: 950-97.

Modigliani F. and M. Miller. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review 48: 261-97.398

Mody A. 1993. Learning through Alliances. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 20: 151-70.

Moe T. M. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science 28: 739-77.

Moe T. M. 1990. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Special Issue 6: 213-53.

Moe T. M. 1991. Politics and the Theory of Organization. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Special Issue 7: 106-29.

M?ller H. 1940. Wirtschaftsordnung, Wirtschaftssystem, und Wirtschaftsstil. Schmolle rs Jahrbuch f?r Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung 64: 75-98,

Monteverde K. and D. J. Teece. 1982, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-13.

Montinola G., Y. Qian and B. R. Weingast. 1995. Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China. World Politics 48: 50-81.

Mookherjee D. 1984. Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents. Review of Economic Studies 51: 433-46.'

Morgenstern O. 1964. Pareto Optimum and Economic Organization. Working paper, Econometric Research Program, Princeton University.

Morishima M. 1959. The Problem of Intrinsic Complementarity and Separability of Goods. Metroeconomica 11: 188-202.

Morris C. 1980. The Cost of Good Intentions. New York: Norton.

Motive zu dem Entw?rfe eines B?rgerlichen Gesetzbuches f?r das Deutsche Reich. 1888. Band III, Sachenrecht. Berlin and Leipzig: J, Guttentag.

Mulherin J. H., J. M. Netter and J. A. Overdahl. 1991. Prices are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective. Journal of Law and Economics 34: 591-644.

M?ller-Graff P. C. 1988. Franchising: A Case of Long-Term Contracts, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144: 122-44.

M?ller-Hagedorn L. 1995. The Variety of Distribution Systems. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151: 186-211.

Mussa M. 1981. Sticky Prices and Disequilibrium Adjustment in a Rational Model of the Inflationary Process. American Economic Review 71: 1020-27.

Myerson R. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nalebuff B. and J. Stiglitz. 1983. Information, Competition, and Markets. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 73: 278-83. Nasse E. 1879. ?ber die Verh?tung von Produktionskrisen durch staatliche F?rsorge. Jahrbuch f?r Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 3: 145-89.

Negishi T. 1979. Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Nelson P. 1970. Information and Consumer Behavior. Journal of Political Economy 78: 311-29.

Nelson P. 1974. Advertising as Information. Journal of Political Economy 82: 729-54.

Nelson R. 1981. Assessing Private Enterprise: An Exegesis of Tangled Doctrine. Bell Journal of Economics 12: 93-111.

Nelson R. and S. G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.399

Nerlove M. and K. J. Arrow. 1962. Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions. Economica 29: 129-42.

Nermuth M. 1982. Information Structures in Economics. Heidelberg: Springer.

Netting R. M. 1981. Balancing on an Alp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nicholls W. H. 1951. Price Policy in the Cigarette Industry: A Study of «Concerted Action» and Its Social Control, 1911-50. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Nichols T. 1969. Ownership, Control, and Ideology. London: Alien and Unwin.

Niehans J. 1969. Money in a Static Theory of Optimal Payment Arrangements. Journal of Money, Credit, 'and Banking 1: 706-26.

Niehans J. 1971. Money and Barter in General Equilibrium with Transaction Costs. American Economic Review 61: 773-83.

Niehans J. 1975. Interest and Credit in General Equilibrium with Transaction Costs. American Economic Review 65: 548-66.

Niehans J. 1978. The Theory of Money. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Niskanen W. 1968. Nonmarket Decision Making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 58: 293-305.400

North D. C. 1978. Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History. Journal of Economic Literature 16: 963-78.

North D. C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York and London: Norton.

North D. C. 1984a. Government and the Cost of Exchange. Journal of Economic History 44: 255-64.

North D. C. 1984b. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History. Zeit- schrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 140: 7-17.

North D. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.401

North D. C. 1993. Institutions and Credible Commitment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 11-23.

North D. C. 1994. Economic Performance through Time. American Economic Review 84: 359-68. Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Science.

North D. C. 1997. Prologue. In: J. N. Drobak and J. V. C. Nye, eds., The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics, 3-12. San Diego: Academic Press.

North D. C. and R. P. Thomas. 1971. The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical Model. Journal of Economic History 31: 777-803.

North D. C. and R. P. Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North D. C. and Thomas R. P. 1977. The First Economic Revolution. Economic History Review 30: 229-241.

North D. C. and B. R. Weingast. 1989. The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England. Journal of Economic History 49: 803-32.

Noyes C. R. 1936. The Institution of Property: A Study of the Development, Substance, and Arrangement of the System of Property in Modern Anglo- American Law. New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green.

Nozick R. 1975. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.

Nugent J. B. and N. Sanchez. 1989. The Efficiency of the Mesta: A Parable. Explorations in Economic History 20: 261-84. \

Nutter G. W. 1968. Markets without Property: A Grand Illusion. In: N. A. Beadles and L. A. Dewry, Jr., eds., Money, the Market, and the State, 137-45. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Obin J. 1965. Money and Economic Growth. Econometrica 33: 671-84.

O’Guin M. 1990. Focus the Factory with Activity-Based Costing. Management Accounting 71, no. 2: 36-41.

Oi W. Y. 1990. Productivity in the Distributive Trades: The Shopper and the Economies of Massed Reserves. Economic and Legal Organization Workshop, University of Rochester. Mimeo.

Okun A. M. 1981. Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell.

Olson M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.402

Oppenheimer F. 1922. Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage: Versuch einer neuen Grundlegung der Gesellschaftswissenschaft. 2d ed. Jena: Fischer.

Ordeshook P. C. 1990. The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy. In: J. E. Alt and S. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, 9-30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostroy J. M. and R. M. Starr. 1990. The Transaction Role of Money. In: B. M. Friedman, ed., Handbook of Monetary Economics, 3-62. Amsterdam: North- Holland.

Oye K. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. World Politics 38: 1-24.

Pease J. G. and H. Chitty. 1958. Pease and Chitty’s Law of Markets and Fairs, 2d ed. Edited by H. Parrish. London: C. Knight.

Pejovich S. 1969. Liberman's Reforms and Property Rights in the Soviet Union. Journal of Law and Economics 12: 155-62.

Pejovich S. 1972. Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union: Their Causes and Purpose. Modern Age 16: 68-76.

Pejovich S. 1973. The Banking System and the Investment Behavior of the Yugoslav Firm. In: M. Bornstein, ed., Plan and Market, 294-301. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pejovich S. 1978. The Codetermination Movement in the West. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Pejovich S. 1990. The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a Theory of Comparative Systems. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.

Pejovich S. 1995. Economic Analysis of Institutions and Systems. Boston: Kluwer Academic. ,

Persson T. 1988. Credibility of Macroeconomic Policy: An Introduction and a Broad Survey. European Economic Review 32: 519-32.

Persson T. and G. Tabellini. 1990. Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics, Chur: Harwood Academic.

Phlips L. 1988. The Economics of Imperfect Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pingle M. 1992. Costly Optimization: An Experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 17: 3-30.

Plant A. 1934. The Economic Aspects of Copyrights in Books. Economica 1: 167-95.

Pommerehne W. W., L. P. Feld and A. Hart. 1994. Voluntary Provision of a Public Good: Results from a Real World Experiment. Kyklos 47: 505-18.

Popper K. R. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 1: The Spell of Plato. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.403

Popper K. R. 1957. The Poverty of Historicism. 2d ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.404

Porter M. E. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press.405

Posner R. A. 1972a. The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3: 98-129.

Posner R. A. 1972b. The Economic Analysis of Law. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown.

Posner R. A. 1980. A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Primitive Law. Journal of Law and Economics 23: 1-53.

Posner R. A. 1993a. The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 73-87.

Posner R. A. 1993b. Reply. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 119-21.

Powell W. W. 1990. Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. Research in Organizational Behavior 12: 295-336.

Powell W. W. and P. J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991 .'The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Prescott E. C. and M. Visscher.. 1980. Organization Capital. Journal of Political Economy 88: 446-61.

Prybyla J. 1969. Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts.

Putterman L. 1984. On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor. Economic Inquiry 22: 171-87.

Putterman L., ed. 1986a. The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Putterman L. 1986b. Corporate Governance, Risk-Bearing, and Economic Power: A Comment on Recent Work by Oliver Williamson. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 422-34.

Radbruch G. 1956. Rechtsphilosophie. 5th ed. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler.

Radner R. 1981. Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal- Agent Relationship. Econometrica 49: 1127-48.

Rapoport A. 1960. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Rapoport A. 1967. Games Which Simulate Deterrence and Disarmament. Clark- ston, Ont.: Canadian Peace Research Institute.

Rasmusen E. 1989. Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Rayner B. 1987. Accounting for Change in the Electronic Industry. Electronic Business, October 15, 118-23.

Reinganum J. and L. Wilde. 1986. Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs. Rand Journal of Economics 17: 557-66.

Reny R 1985. Rationality, Common Knowledge, and the Theory of Games. Department of Economics, Princeton University. Mimeo.

Ress G. 1994. Ex Ante Safeguards against Ex Post Opportunism and International Treaties: The Boundary Question. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 279-303.

Rey P. and B. Salanie. 1987. Long-term, Short-term, and Renegotiation. Working Papers, no. 8715, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Eco- nomiques, Paris.

Rey P. and J. Tirole. 1986. The Logic of Vertical Restraints. American Economic Review 76: 921-39.

Rheinstein M. 1935-36. Some Fundamental Differences in Real Property Ideas of the «Civil Law» and the «Common Law» Systems. Chicago Law Review 3: 624-35.

Richter R. 1979. Currency and Economic Reform: West Germany after World War II, a Symposium, Editorial Preface. Zeitschrift f?r die gesamte Staats- wissenschaft/Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 135: 297-300.

Richter R. 1989a. Money: Lectures on the Basis of General Equilibrium Theory and the Economics of Institutions. Heidelberg: Springer.

Richter R. 1989b. The Louvre Accord from the Viewpoint of the New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 145: 704-19.

Richter R., ed. 1990. Views and Comments on Bounded Rationality as Applied to Modern Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 648-748. N

Richter R. 1992a. A Socialist Market Economy: Can It Work? Kyklos 45: 185-207.

Richter R. 1992b. ?ber Papierstandards, W?hrungsunionen und das Ende der D-Mark. Wirtschaftstheoretische Kritikpunkte zum Thema Europ?ische W?hrungsunion. Discussion Paper, Universit?t des Saarlandes, Saarbr?cken.

Richter R. 1993. «Stability Culture» as a Problem of Modern Institutional Economics. Translated from the German by M. Hudson. Working Paper, Center for the Study of the New Institutional Economics, Universit?t des Saarlandes, Saarbr?cken.

Richter R. 1994. «Stabilit?tskultur» als Problem der Institutionen?konomik. In: H.

Hesse and O. Issing, eds., Symposium Geld und Moral, 73-90. Munich: F. Vahlen.

Richter R. 1996a. Bridging Old and New Institutional Economics: Gustav Schmol- ler, the Leader of the Younger German Historical School, Seen with Neoinstitutionalists’ Eyes. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152:

568-92.

Richter R. 1996b. Die Neue Institutionen?konomik des Marktes. Lectiones Jen- ensis, Heft 5. Jena: Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen. Richter R. and E. G. Furubotn. 1996. Neue Institutionen?konomik: Einf?hrung und Kritische W?rdigung. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Richter R. and U. Schmidt-Mohr. 1992. An Institutional Analysis of the Louvre Accord. In: H. Giersch, ed., Money, Trade, and Competition: Essays in Honor of Egon Sohmen, 59-86. Berlin: Springer.

Riker W. H. and D. L. Weimer. 1995. The Political Economy of Transformation: Liberalization and Property Rights. In: J. S. Banks and E. A. Hanushek, eds., Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, 80-107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Riley J. G. 1975. Competitive Signalling. Journal of Economic Theory 10: 174— 86.

Riley J. G. 1979a. Informational Equilibrium. Econometrica 47: 331-59.

Riley J. G. 1979b. Noncooperative Equilibrium and Market Signalling. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 69: 303-07.

Riley J. G. 1985. Competition with Hidden Knowledge. Journal of Political Economy 93: 958-76.

Rinkes J. G. and G. H. Samuel. 1992. Contractual and Non-contractual Obligations in English Law: Systematic Analysis of the English Law of Obligations in Comparative Context of the -Netherlands Civil Code. Nijmwegen: Ars Aequi Libri.

Rogerson W. P. 1984. Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. Rand Journal of Economics 15: 39-53.

Rogerson W. P. 1985. Repeated Moral Hazard. Econometrica 53: 69-76.

Rogoff K. 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 50: 1169-89.

Rogoff K. 1987. Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy, 141-82. Car- negie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, no. 26. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Rosen S. 1985. Implicit Contracts: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 23: 1144-75.

Rosen S. 1987. Human Capital. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 681-90. London: Macmillan.

Rosenthal J. L. 1990. The Development of Irrigation in Provence, 1700-1860: The French Revolution and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic History 50: 615-38.

Ross S. 1973. The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 63: 134-39.

Roth A. E. 1995. Introduction to Experimental Economics. In: J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, eds., The Handbook^of Experimental Economics, 3-109. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rothschild M. and J. Stiglitz. 1976. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 80: 629-49.

Rubin P. 1978. The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract. Journal of Law and Economics 21: 223-33.

Rubinstein A. 1986. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 39: 83-96.

Rubinstein A. 1987. A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining. In: T. Bevvley, ed., Advances in Economic Theory, 197-224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rubinstein A. and M. E, Yaari. 1980. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard. Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Mimeo.

Rumelt R. P., D. Schendel and D. J. Teece. 1991. Strategic Management and Economics. Strategic Management Journal 12: 5-29.

Sah R. K. 1991. Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 2: 67-88.

Salop J. and S. Salop. 1976. Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 619-27.

Samuelson P. A. 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.406

Samuelson P. A. 1957. Wage and Interest: A Modern Dissection of Marxian Economic Models. American Economic Review 47: 884-912.

Samuelson P. A. 1968. What Classical and Neoclassical Monetary Theory Really Was. Canadian Journal of Economics 1: 1-15.

Sappington D. E. M. 1991. Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 2: 45-66.

Sauermann H. and R. Selten. 1959. Ein Oligopolexperiment, Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Staatswissenschaftf Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 115: 427-71.

Sauermann H. and R. Selten. 1962. Anspruchsanpassungstheorie der Unter- nehmung. Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Staatswissenschaftf Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 118: 577-97.

Schaffle A. E. F. [1874] 1885. Die Quintessenz des Sozialismus. 8th ed. Gotha: Perthes.

Schanze E. 1995. Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The Regulation of Markets That Have Escaped Regulated Markets. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151: 162-76.

Schein E. H. 1986. Organizational Culture and Leadership, San Francisco: Jos- sey-Bass.

Schelling T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schelling T. C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scherer F. M. 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 2d ed. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Scherer F. M. 1987. Selling Costs. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 4: 300-301. London: Macmillan.

Schlicht E. 1978. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure, and Natural Unemployment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 134: 337-46.

Schlicht E. 1983. The Tenant’s Decreasing Willingness to Pay and the Rent Abatement Phenomenon. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 139: 155-59.

Schlicht E. 1984. Cognitive Dissonance in Economics. In: H. Todt, ed., Normengeleitetes Verhalten in den Sozialwissenschaften, 61-82. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot.

Schlicht E. 1997. On Custom in the Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schmalensee R. 1972. The Economics of Advertising. Amsterdam: North-Hol- land.

Schmalensee R. 1986. Inter-industry Studies of Structure and Performance. In: R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, 2: 951-1009. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Schmalensee R. 1987. Industrial Organization. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2: 803-8. London: Macmillan.

Schmidt-Mohr U. 1992. Informations?konomische Theorien der Bankunternehmung und des Bankverhaltens. Ph.D. diss., Universit?t des Saarlandes, Saarbr?cken.

Schmidt-Trenz H.-J. and D. Schmidtchen. 1991. Private International Trade in the Shadow of the Territoriality of Law: Why Does It Work? Southern Economic Journal 58: 329-38.

Schmidtchen D. 1984. German «Ordnungspolitik» as Institutional Choice. Zeitschrift f?r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft/Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 54-70.

Schmidtchen D. and H.-J. Schmidt-Trenz. 1990. New Institutional Economics of International Transactions. In: E. Boetcher et al., eds., Jahrbuch f?r Neue Politische ?konomie, 3-34. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Schmoller G. von. 1881. Die Gerechtigkeit in der Volkswirtschaft. Jahrbuch f?r Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft im deutschen Reich 5: 19-

54.

Schmoller G. von. 1883. Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Socialwissenschaften. Jahrbuch f?r Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung ur\d Volkswirtschaft im deutschen Reich 7: 965-94.

Schmoller G. von. 1900. Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot.

Schotter A. 1981. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schultz T. 1963. The Economic Value of Education. New York: Columbia University Press. Schumpeter J. A. [1918] 1954. The Crisis of the Tax State. Translated by W. F. Stolper and A. Musgrave. In: A. Peacock et al., eds., International Economic Papers, 4: 5-38. London: Macmillan.

Schumpeter J. A. 1926. Gustav Schmoller und die Probleme von heute. Schmol- lers Jahrbuch f?r Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung 50: 337-88.

Schumpeter J. A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.407

Schumpeter J. A. 1955. History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press.408

Schumpeter J. A. 1970. Das Wesen des Geldes. Edited by F. K. Mann. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

Schwartz A. 1992. Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies. Journal of Legal Studies 21: 271-318.

Schweizer U. 1988. Externalities and the Coase Theorem: Hypothesis or Result? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144: 245-66.

Scott K. 1994. Bounded Rationality and Social Norms: Concluding Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 315-19.

Scott R. E. 1990. A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 29: 597-616.

Selten R. 1965. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetr?gheit. Zeitschrift f?r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121: 301-24.

Selten R. 1967. Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschr?nkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments. In: H. Sauermann, ed., Contributions to Experimental Economics, 1: 136-68. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Selten R. 1970. Ein Marktexperiment. In: H. Sauermann, ed., Contributions to Experimental Economics, 2: 33-98. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Selten R. 1975. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory 4: 25-55.

Selten R. 1990. Bounded Rationality. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 649-58.

Sen A. 1990. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Basic Blackwell.409

Sertel M. 1982. Workers and Incentives. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Seyffert R. 1966. Wege und Kosten der Distribution der industriell gefertigten Konsumwaren. Cologne and Opiaden: Westdeutscher.

Shapiro C. 1983. Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 97: 659-79.

Shapiro C. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1984. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device. American Economic Review 74: 433-44.

Shavell S. 1979. Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal Agent Relationship. Bell Journal of Economics 80: 55-73.

Shavell S. 1980. Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. Bell Journal of Eco- nomics 11: 466-90.

Shelanski H. A. and P. G. Klein. 1995. Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11: 335-61.

Shell G. R. 1991. Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Towards a New Cause of Action. Vanderbilt Law Review 44: 221-

82.

Shepsle K. A. 1978. The Grant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shepsle K. A. and B. R. Weingast. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. American Political Science Review 81: 85-104.

Shleifer A. 1985. A Theory of Yardstick Competition. Rand Journal of Economics 16: 319-27.

Siegel S. and L. E. Fouraker. 1960. Bargaining and Group Decision Making: Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Simmel G. 1978. The Philosophy of Money. Translated by T. Bottomore and D. Frisby. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.410

Simon H. A. 1951. A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship. Econometric a 19: 293-305.

Simon H. A. 1957. Models of Man. New York: Wiley.

Simon H. A. 1987. Bounded Rationality. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1: 266-68. London: Macmillan.

Simon H. A. 1991. Organizations and Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 2: 25-44.

Singer A. E. 1994. Strategy as Moral Philosophy. Strategic Management Journal 15: 191-214.

Smith A. [ 1776] 1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. General editors R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, textual editor W. B. Todd. Oxford: Clarendon Press.411

Smith A. [1790] 1975. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.412

Smith B. D. 1984. Private Information, Deposit Interest Rates, and the «Stability» of the Banking System. Journal of Monetary Economics 14: 293-317.

Smith C. 1982. Pricing Mortgage Originations. AREUEA Journal 10 (Fall): 313-30.

Smiths C. and L. Wakeman. 1985. Determinants of Corporate Leasing Policy. Journal of Finance 40: 895-908.

Smith V. L. 1969. On Models of Commercial Fishing. Journal of Political Economy 77: 181-98.

Snidal D. 1985. The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. International Organization 39: 579-614.

Sohmen E. 1976. Allokationstheorie und Allokationspolitik. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Solow R. M. 1979. Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness. Journal of Macroeconomics 1: 79-82.

Solow R. M. 1985. Economic History and Economics. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 75: 328-31.

Spence A. M. 1973. Job Market Signalling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 355-74.

Spence A. M. 1974. Market Signalling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Spence A. M. 1976. Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 591-97.

Spence A. M. 1977. Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Producer Liability. Review of Economic Studies 44: 561-72.

Spence A. M. and R. Zeckhauser. 1971. Insurance, Information, and Individual Action. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 61: 380-87.

Spremann K. 1987. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing. In: G. Bamberg and K. Spremann, eds., Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, 3-37. Heidelberg: Springer.

Starr J. A. and I. C. MacMillan. 1990. Resource Cooptation via Social Contracting: Resource Acquisition Strategies for New Ventures. Strategic Management Journal 11: 79-92.

Starret D. A. 1973. Inefficiency and the Demand of «Money» in a Sequence Economy. Review of Economic Studies 40: 347-448.

Steinherr A. 1977. On the Efficiency of Profit Sharing and Labor Participation in Management. Bell Journal of Economics 8: 545-55.

Stigler G. J. 1961. The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy 69: 213-25.413

Stigler G. J. 1968. The Organization of Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stigler G. J. 1972. The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to Scholars. Journal of Legal Studies 1: 1-12.

Stigler G. J. 1974. Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5: 359-65.

Stigler G. J. and G. S. Becker. 1977. De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. American Economic Review 67: 76-90.

Stiglitz J. E. 1974. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies 41: 219-55.

Stiglitz J. E. 1975. The Theory of «Screening», Education, and the Distribution of Income. American Economic Review 65: 283-300.

Stiglitz J. E. 1985. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective. Economic Journal, Supplement 95: 21-41.

Stiglitz J. E. 1987. The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price. Journal of Economic Literature 25: 1-48.

Stiglitz J. E. 1991. Another Century of Economic Science. Economic Journal 101: 134-41.

Stiglitz J. E. 1994. Whither Socialism. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Stiglitz J. E. and A. Weiss. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review 71: 393-410.

Stole L. A. 1991. Mechanism Design under Common Agency. Working Paper, MIT, July.

St?tzel W. 1959. Liquidit?t. In: E. von Beckerath, ed., Handw?rterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, 6: 622-29. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) and Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

Sugden R. 1986. The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sugden R, 1989. Spontaneous Order. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4: 85-97.

Sutton J. 1986. Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction. Review of Economic Studies 53: 709-24.

Sutton J. 1990. Explaining Everything, Explaining Nothing? Game Theoretic Models in Industrial Economics. European Economic Review 34: 505-12.

Sutton J. 1992. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Swedberg R. 1990. Economics and Sociology, Redefining Their Boundaries: Conversations with Economists and Sociologists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Taylor P. 1987. The Simple Analytics of Implicit Labour Contracts. In: J. D. Hey and P. J. Lambert, eds., Surveys in the Economics of Uncertainty, 151-72. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Teece D. J. 1977. Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of Transferring Technological Know-How. Economic Journal 87: 242-61.

Teece D. J. 1992a. Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 18: 1-25.

Teece D. J. 1992b. Strategies for Capturing the Financial Benefits from Technological Innovation. In: N. Rosenberg, R. Sandau and D. C. Movvrey, eds., Technology and the Wealth of Nations, 174-205. Stanford: Stanford University Press.414

Telser L. G. 1980. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. Journal of Business 53: 27-44.

Telser L. G. 1981. Why There Are Organized Futures Markets. Journal of Law and Economics 24: 1-22.

Thaler R. H. 1994. Quasi Rational Economics. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Thomas L. G. 1989. Advertising in Consumer Goods Industries: Durability, Economics of Scale, and Heterogeneity. Journal of Law and Economics 32: 163-93.

Tietz R. 1990. On Bounded Rationality: Experimental Work at the University of Frankfurt/Main. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146: 659-72.

Tirole J. 1986. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organization. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2: 182-214.

Tirole J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press.415

Tirole J. 1994. Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand? Walras-Bowley lecture, delivered at the 1994 North American summer meetings of the Econometric Society, Quebec City.

Tobin J. 1956. The Interest-Elasticity of Transaction Demand for Cash. Review of Economics and Statistics 38: 241-47.

Tollison R. D. 1982. Rent-Seeking: A Survey. Kyklos 35: 575-602.

Tollison R. D. 1988. Public Choice and Legislation. Virginia Law Review 74: 339-71.

Townsend R. 1982. Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information. Journal of Political Economy 90: 1166-86.

Tullock G. 1974. The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

Tullock G. 1975. The Transitional Gains Trap. Bell Journal of Economics 6: 671-78.

Tullock G. 1989. The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Ullmann-Margalit, E. 1978. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ulph A. M. and D. T. Ulph. 1975. Transaction Costs in General Equilibrium Theory: A Survey. Economica 42: 355-72.

Vanberg V. J. 1992. Organizations as Constitutional Systems. Constitutional Political Economy 3: 223-53.

Vanberg W. 1982. Markt und Organisation: Individualistische Sozialtheorie und das Problem korperativen Handelns. T?bingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Vanek J. 1969. Decentralization under Workers’ Management: A Theoretical Appraisal. American Economic Review 59: 1006-14.

Vanek J. 1970. The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Vanek J. 1977. The Labor-Managed Economy. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press.

Vanek J. 1990. On the Transition from Centrally Planned to Democratic Socialist Economies. Economic and Industrial Democracy 11: 179-203.

Varian H. R. 1987. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. New York and London: Norton.416

Varian H. R. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis. 3d ed. New York and London: Norton.

Varian H. R. 1993. What Use Is Economic Theory? Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Michigan.

Veljanovski C. 1991. Privatization in Transition Economics. Paper delivered to the Anglo-Soviet Symposium on Public International Law, London.

Wagner A. 1894. Grundlegung der Politischen ?konomie. Zweiter Teil. Volkswirtschaft und Recht, besonders Verm?gensrecht. 3d ed. Leipzig: C. F. Win- ter’sche.

Wagner A. 1907. Theoretische Sozial?konomik oder Allgemeine und Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre: Grundriss tunlichst in prinzipieller Behandlungsweise. Erste Abteilung. Leipzig: C. F. Winter’sche.

Wallis J. J. and D. C. North. 1988. Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970. In: S. L. Engerman and R. E. Gallman, eds., Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, 95-161. Studies in Income and Wealth, no. 51. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Walras L. 1954. Elements of Pure Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth. Translated by W. Jaff?. London: Alien and Unwin. (Translation of the edition d?finitive (1926) of El?ments dEconomie Politique Pure.)417

Waltz K. 1979. Theory of World Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Ward B. 1958. The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism. American Economic Review 48: 566-89.

Watts R. and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Weber M. 1905. Die Protestantische Ethik und der «Geist» des Kapitalismus. Archiv f?r Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Neue Folge 2: 1-54.418

Weber M. 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen and Unwin. English translation of Weber 1905.

Weber M. 1968. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weber M. 1990. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Edited by J. Winckelmann. Tiibin- gen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Reprint of the 5th edition; first edition 1918.

Weingast B. R. 1984. Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to SEC). Public Choice 44: 147-91.

Weingast B. R. 1988. Political Institutions and Public Performance in Modern America: The Paradox of Public Policy Performance. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Mimeo.

Weingast B. R. 1989. The Political Institutions of Representative Government. Working Papers, no. P-89-14. Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Weingast B. R. 1993. Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 286-311.

Weingast B. R. 1994. A Rational Choice Perspective on Shared Belief Systems: The Role of Sovereignity. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Mimeo.

Weingast B. R. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11: 1-31.

Weingast B. R. and W. Marshall. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress. Journal of Political Economy 96: 132-63.

Weiss A. 1991. Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Dispersion. Oxford: Clarendon.

Weiss L. W., G. Pascoe and S. Martin. 1983. The Size of Selling Costs. Review of Economics and Statistics 65: 668-72.

Weitzman M. L. 1980. The «Ratchet Principle» and Performance Incentives. Bell Journal of Economics 11: 302-08.

Weitzman M. L. 1981. Toward a Theory of Contract Types. MIT. Mimeo.

Weizs?cker C. C. 1971. Die zeitliche Struktur des Produktionsprozesses und das Problem der Einkommensverteilung zwischen Kapital und Arbeit. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 106: 1-33.

Weizs?cker C. C. von. 1993. Wirtschaftsordnung und Unternehmung. In: W. Wittmann, et al., eds., Handw?rterbuch der Betriebswirtschaft, Teilband 3: 4721- 33. 5th ed. Stuttgart: Sch?fer-Poeschel.

Whitcomb D. 1972. Externalities and Welfare. New York: Columbia University Press.

White L. 1982. The Regulation of Air Pollutant Emissions from Motor Vehicles. Washingtion, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Wiggins S. N. 1991. The Economics of the Firm and Contracts: A Selective Survey. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 147: 603-61.

Williamson O. E. 1963. Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior. American Economic Review 53: 1032-55.

Williamson O. E. 1967. Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size. Journal of Political Economy 75: 123-38.

Williamson O. E. 1971. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 61: 112— 23.419

Williamson O. E. 1973. Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 63: 316-25.

Williamson O. E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.

Williamson O. E. 1976. Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in General and with Respect to CATV. Bell Journal of Economics 7: 73-104.

Williamson O. E. 1979. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233-61.

Williamson O. E. 1980. The Organization of Work. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1: 5-38.

Williamson O. E. 1981. The Modern Corporation: Origin, Evolution, Attributes. Journal of Economic Literature 19: 1537-68.

Williamson O. E. 1983. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange. American Economic Review 73 : 519-40. •

Williamson O. E. 1984. The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 195-223.

Williamson O. E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.420

Williamson O. E. 1988. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 43: 567-91.

Williamson O. E. 1991. Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1: 159-87.

Williamson O. E. 1993a. The Evolving Science of Organization. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 36-63.

Williamson O. E. 1993b. Contested Exchange versus the Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 1: 103-8.

Williamson O. E. 1993c. Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 99- 118.

Williamson O. E. 1993d. Transaction Cost Economics and the Evolving Science of Organization. May. Mimeo.

Williamson O. E. I993e. Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory. Industrial and Corporate Change 2: 107-56.

Williamson O. E. 1994. Concluding Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150: 320-24.

Williamson O. E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williamson O. E., M. L. Wachter and J. E. Harris. 1975. Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange. Bell Journal of Economics 6: 250-80.

Williamson S. D. 1986. Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing. Journal of Monetary Economics 18: 159-79.

Williamson S. D. 1987. Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 135-79.

Wilson C. 1977. A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic Theory 16: 167-207.

Winter S. 1964. Economic «Natural Selection» and the Theory of the Firm. Yale Economics Essays 4: 225-72.

Winter S. 1975. Optimization and Evolution in the Theory of the Firm. In: R. Day and T. Graves, eds., Adaptive Economic Models, 73-118. New York: Academic.

Wiseman J. 1991. The Black Box. Economic Journal 101: 149-55.

Worrall T. 1989. Labor Contract Theory. In: F. Hahn, ed., The'Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, 336-48. Oxford: Clarendon.

Yarbrough B. V. and R. M. Yarbrough. 1992. Cooperation and Governance in International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Yellen, J. 1984. Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment. American Economic Review 74: 200-208.

Zaleski E. 1967. Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962-1966. Translated by M. C. MacAndrew and G. W. Nutter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Zender J. 1991. Optimal Financial Instruments. Journal of Finance 46: 1645-65.

<< | >>
Источник: Эрик Г. Фуруботн и Рудольф Рихтер. Институты и экономическая теория. Достижения новой институциональной экономической теории. 2005

Еще по теме ЛИТЕРАТУРА:

  1. СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
  2. Источники и литература
  3. Рекомендуемая литература
  4. 5. Литература о венчурном капитализме
  5. Список литературы
  6. Список литературы
  7. Список литературы.
  8. Рекомендуемая литература
  9. Рекомендуемая литература
  10. Список литературы
  11. Литература
  12. Литература
  13. 4. РЕКОМЕНДУЕМЫЕ ИСТОЧНИКИ И ЛИТЕРАТУРА ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ
  14. СПИСОК НОРМАТИВНЫХ ИСТОЧНИКОВ И ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
  15. ЛИТЕРАТУРА
- Бюджетная система - Внешнеэкономическая деятельность - Государственное регулирование экономики - Инновационная экономика - Институциональная экономика - Институциональная экономическая теория - Информационные системы в экономике - Информационные технологии в экономике - История мировой экономики - История экономических учений - Кризисная экономика - Логистика - Макроэкономика (учебник) - Математические методы и моделирование в экономике - Международные экономические отношения - Микроэкономика - Мировая экономика - Налоги и налолгообложение - Основы коммерческой деятельности - Отраслевая экономика - Оценочная деятельность - Планирование и контроль на предприятии - Политэкономия - Региональная и национальная экономика - Российская экономика - Системы технологий - Страхование - Товароведение - Торговое дело - Философия экономики - Финансовое планирование и прогнозирование - Ценообразование - Экономика зарубежных стран - Экономика и управление народным хозяйством - Экономика машиностроения - Экономика общественного сектора - Экономика отраслевых рынков - Экономика полезных ископаемых - Экономика предприятий - Экономика природных ресурсов - Экономика природопользования - Экономика сельского хозяйства - Экономика таможенного дел - Экономика транспорта - Экономика труда - Экономика туризма - Экономическая история - Экономическая публицистика - Экономическая социология - Экономическая статистика - Экономическая теория - Экономический анализ - Эффективность производства -